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DOCTORS, DISCIPLINE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: 
PROFESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
SAFE HARBOR POLICIES 
 
Nadia N. Sawicki* 
 
State capital punishment statutes generally contemplate the 
involvement of medical providers, and courts have acknowledged that the 
qualifications of lethal injection personnel have a constitutionally relevant 
dimension.  However, the American Medical Association has consistently 
voiced its opposition to any medical involvement in executions.  In recent 
years, some states have responded to this conflict by adopting statutory 
mechanisms to encourage medical participation in lethal injections.  
Foremost among these are safe harbor policies, which prohibit state 
medical boards from taking disciplinary action against licensed medical 
personnel who participate in executions.   
This Article posits that safe harbor policies, as limitations on 
medical board autonomy, must be viewed not merely as artifacts of the 
political discourse on capital punishment, but as part of the historical 
narrative of American medical regulation.  As a matter of policy, safe 
harbors cannot be defended by reference to the three traditional 
justifications for regulating medical professionals -- they are not necessary 
to keep the profession from exceeding the scope of its delegated powers; 
they do not promote traditional medical goals; and they do not satisfy the 
criteria for promotion of important state goals unrelated to medicine.  This 
Article suggests that safe harbors and other restrictions on board 
autonomy, if not adequately justified, may weaken public confidence in 
the authority and independence of the medical profession.  Because the 
loss of systemic medical trust tends to have a corrosive effect on the 
medical profession’s ability to promote patient interests and public health, 
policymakers should be wary of adopting safe harbors without first 
considering their trust implications in the professional sphere. 
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University.  This research was made possible by the Sharswood Fellowship funding provided by 
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and could not have been completed without the 
help and support of the entire faculty and staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
The author extends special thanks to Anita Allen, Regina Austin, Art Caplan, Deborah Denno, 
Mark Hall, Deborah Hellman, Anne Kringel, Kristin Madison, Serena Mayeri, and Ted Ruger 
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to Ron Day for his invaluable research 
assistance.  An earlier version of this Article was presented at the American Society of Law, 
Medicine, and Ethics’ 31st Annual Health Law Professors Conference. 
2 DOCTORS, DISCIPLINE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 3 
II. Tracing the History of Capital Punishment Safe Harbors ............................... 7 
A. Historical Perspectives on Medicine and Capital Punishment.................... 7 
B. Developing and Legislating the Lethal Injection Procedure ....................... 11 
C. Responses to Threats of Professional Discipline ........................................ 16 
III. Principles of Professional Regulation .............................................................. 25 
A. Self-Regulation and Professional Autonomy .............................................. 26 
B. Justifications for Overriding Professional Self-Regulation ........................ 29 
IV. Evaluating the Justifications for Safe Harbor Policies .................................... 31 
A. Reinforcing the Scope of Authority Delegated to the Profession ............... 31 
B. Serving the Traditional Goals of Medical Regulation ................................ 35 
C. Serving State Interests Unrelated to Medical Regulation ........................... 38 
1. Demonstrating Necessity and Efficacy ............................................. 39 
2. Establishing Safeguards to Protect Medical Interests ....................... 51 
V. Professional Implications of Safe Harbor Policies .......................................... 57 
A. Trust, Medicine, and the Pursuit of Public Interests ................................... 57 
B. Law as a Mechanism for Supporting Systemic Trust ................................. 60 
C. Safe Harbors and their Implications for Medical Trust ............................... 63 
VI. Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................... 66 
 
 DOCTORS, DISCIPLINE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Of the thirty-seven U.S. jurisdictions that authorize the use of capital 
punishment, all but one use lethal injection as an execution method.1  
Nearly every jurisdiction’s lethal injection procedures permit or require the 
presence or participation of a physician or other licensed medical provider.2  
Moreover, courts throughout the country have recognized the Eighth 
Amendment implications of lethal injections administered by personnel 
without adequate medical training.3  A prisoner may suffer pain so 
                                                 
1 Thirty-six states and the federal government use lethal injection as a primary or 
permitted method of capital punishment.  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. __ (2008) (slip op., at 
14); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled 
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 59 (2007) (citing, prior to New Jersey’s 
December 2007 repeal of the death penalty, thirty-seven lethal injection states) [hereinafter, 
Denno 2007]; 28 C.F.R. 26.2 (2008) (authorizing execution by lethal injection in federal 
death penalty cases); 18 U.S.C. 3596 (a) (2007) (authorizing execution “in the manner 
prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed” in death penalty cases 
under the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994).  Only Nebraska’s death penalty statute 
relies exclusively on a different method, electrocution.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2532 (2007); 
but see State v. Mata, 745 N.W. 2d 229 (Neb. 2008) (holding that electrocution is cruel and 
unusual punishment).  
2 See Section II-B, infra.  
3 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. __ (2008) (slip op., at 14) (finding that the “most 
significant” of the safeguards in place to protect against Eighth Amendment violations 
during Kentucky lethal injections is the requirement that IV team members have at least 
one year’s experience as certified medical assistants, phlebotomists, EMTs, paramedics, or 
military corpsmen); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1084 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that, 
because of the risk that prisoners subject to Missouri’s lethal injection procedures might 
suffer extreme pain, “it is imperative for the State to employ personnel who are properly 
trained to competently carry out each medical step of the procedure,” but recognizing that 
such personnel need not be physicians); Brown v. Beck, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60084, at 
*24-25 (E.D. N.C. 2006), aff’d,  445 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that questions raised 
about the constitutionality of North Carolina’s lethal injection procedures “could be 
resolved by the presence of medical personnel” qualified to ensure that the prisoner is 
unconscious); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the 
administration of California's lethal injection protocol by an execution team with little or 
no training or knowledge regarding the necessary drugs creates an undue risk that an 
inmate will suffer pain so extreme that it offends the Eighth Amendment); Morales v. 
Hickman, 415 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D.Cal. 2006), aff’d, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006)  
(permitting the State of California to proceed with Plaintiff’s execution by retaining the 
services of a qualified expert with training and experience in general anesthesia); 
Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W. 3d 292 (Tenn. 2005) (recognizing that “the 
experience, training, and qualifications of persons involved in the lethal injection process” 
are relevant to the question of whether the procedure constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment); State v. Webb, 252 Conn. 128 (2000) (finding that because the “state intends 
to employ either emergency medical technicians, paramedics, or nurses, all trained to insert 
the intravenous catheter,” Connecticut’s lethal injection procedures do not pose an 
unacceptably high risk of suffering). 
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excruciating as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment if execution 
technicians encounter any one of a number of potential problems – if they 
have difficulty placing the intravenous line by which the necessary drugs 
are delivered; improperly prepare the drugs, modify their quantities, or 
administer them in the wrong order; fail to accurately assess the prisoner’s 
anesthetic depth; or are faced with any medical anomaly or emergency that 
necessitates a deviation from standard procedures.   
While no court has yet held that lethal injection procedures are 
unconstitutional per se without physician involvement, and the Supreme 
Court in Baze v. Rees recently limited the availability of challenges to the 
qualifications of execution personnel,4 states have grown increasingly 
concerned that a shortage of qualified medical personnel would make it 
difficult or impossible to conduct executions in accordance with the Eighth 
Amendment.  Indeed, there is legitimate reason for concern about the 
availability of willing personnel – the ethical codes applicable to physicians, 
nurses, emergency medical technicians, and physician assistants uniformly 
denounce participation in executions. 
In an effort to circumvent this potential conflict, some state 
legislatures have taken an unusual step to facilitate the involvement of 
medical personnel in lethal injections.  They have adopted statutory 
provisions that strip state medical boards of the authority to take 
disciplinary action against medical providers who participate in executions, 
effectively immunizing those providers from licensure challenges (“safe 
harbor provisions”).  Many have also adopted provisions that exclude the 
procedures involved in lethal injection from the scope of state medical 
practice acts, effectively ensuring that execution participants will not be 
deemed to be engaged in the practice of medicine (“exclusionary 
provisions”).  Even in the absence of such explicit legislative directives, 
some state courts have held that the existence of criminal procedure statutes 
contemplating medical involvement in lethal injection indicates a legislative 
intent to prohibit boards from disciplining medical participants.5   
                                                 
4 In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure, 
which required IV team members to be certified medical assistants, phlebotomists, EMTs, 
paramedics, or military corpsmen with one year of professional medical experience, but 
prohibited participation by physicians in the execution process.  Baze, 553 U.S. __ (slip 
op., at 6-7, 16).  In upholding the Kentucky procedure against a challenge to the 
qualifications and training of the execution personnel, the Court set a very high standard 
for future challenges to lethal injection procedures in states with more stringent medical 
personnel requirements than those imposed by Kentucky, and effectively shut down future 
lines of argument grounded in the constitutional necessity of physician participation. Id. 
(slip op., at 15-17, 20-21).   
5 See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Bd., Civ. No. 07-003574 (N.C. 
Super. Ct., Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that judicial executions are outside the scope of the 
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Despite the wealth of literature examining the ethical underpinnings 
and practical ramifications of the medical profession’s position against 
involvement in executions, legal scholars have not yet examined the history, 
theoretical foundation, or likely consequences of disciplinary safe harbor 
policies.6  Even the most recent articles about physician participation in 
capital punishment mention these policies only in passing.7  Given the 
Supreme Court’s recent resolution of the Eighth Amendment challenge in 
Baze v. Rees, states may soon be re-evaluating the constitutionality of their 
lethal injection procedures as well as their strategies for encouraging 
medical involvement in executions.  Thus, it is imperative that the academic 
community take the lead in understanding and critically evaluating existing 
safe harbor provisions, with the goal of providing policy guidance to states 
that may be considering similar legislation.  This Article is the first 
commentary in what should become a broad academic exchange on the 
merits of legislative interventions designed to eliminate barriers to medical 
participation in lethal injection.   
Section II provides the historical context for understanding safe 
harbors and other mechanisms for facilitating medical involvement in 
executions.  Section III situates safe harbor policies in the context of 
traditional medical regulation and identifies three justifiable reasons for 
limiting the disciplinary discretion of state medical boards: (1) if the boards 
are exceeding the scope of their delegated powers, (2) if the limitations are 
necessary to promote the state’s traditional medical interests in patient 
welfare and public health, and (3) if the limitations satisfy the criteria 
necessary to secure demonstrably compelling state goals unrelated to 
medicine.  In Section IV, both existing and potential disciplinary safe 
harbors are evaluated with respect to these three justifications and found to 
                                                                                                                            
Medical Practice Act and do not constitute medical procedures subject to board review); 
Thorburn v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (Cal. App. 1998) (holding that the 
California legislature did not intend to include physician participation in executions within 
the ambit of unprofessional conduct subject to injunction by the court). 
6 Moreover, discussions by legal scholars of the contentious issue of physician 
participation in executions tend to focus on the extent to which medical ethics have 
hampered the implementation of a constitutional system of capital punishment. See, e.g., 
Denno 2007, supra note 1 (addressing how “medicine has dismantled the death penalty”).  
The inquiry posed in this Article instead examines the effect of safe harbor statutes on the 
practice of medicine as a whole.   
7 For brief references to disciplinary safe harbors in the context of capital punishment, 
see Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 89-90; Daniel N. Lerman, Second Opinion: Inconsistent 
Deference to Medical Ethics in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1941, 1951, 
note 56 (2007); Joan M. LeGraw and Michael A. Grodin, Health Professionals and Lethal 
Injection Execution in the United States, 24:2 HUMAN RIGHTS QTLY. 382, 416 (2002); Cary 
Federman and Dave Holmes, Caring to Death: Health Care Professionals and Capital 
Punishment, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 441, 442 (2000). 
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be lacking. 
Section V argues that disciplinary safe harbors and other limitations 
on board authority, if not adequately defended as a matter of policy, may 
have dangerous implications for the medical profession and for society at 
large.  Unjustified state interventions in medical board decision-making 
may erode public trust in the independence and authority of the medical 
profession, in turn implicating the profession’s effectiveness in achieving 
the public goals with which it has been tasked.  Given the significance of 
these potential consequences, states should be wary of adopting safe harbors 
without first considering their trust implications in the professional sphere. 
Section VI concludes with two recommendations for policymakers 
evaluating strategies for facilitating medical involvement in executions.  
First, as a matter of health care policy, policymakers should ensure that 
such strategies are justified by reference to compelling state interests 
beyond the merely expressive and do not have unintended effects on 
systemic medical trust.  Second, as a matter of capital punishment policy, 
policymakers ought to consider whether maintaining medical involvement 
in a quasi-clinical execution procedure serves constitutional or merely 
cosmetic values. 
The analysis set forth in this Article by no means presupposes 
opposition to capital punishment in general or to physician participation in 
lethal injection in particular.8  Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether, if we 
as a society believe that capital punishment is a worthwhile endeavor, states 
should facilitate medical involvement in lethal injection by restricting the 
disciplinary discretion of state medical boards.  This Article concludes that, 
given the open questions about the trust implications of such legislative 
interventions, they should not. 
 
                                                 
8 I expressly reserve the question of whether the medical community’s opposition to 
participation in lethal injection is, as a normative matter, the best interpretation of the 
profession’s ethical principles.  That said, I also recognize that there is a “danger in 
discussing the morality of methods when it is the ends themselves that must be resisted.”  
Gerald Dworkin, Patients and Prisoners: The Ethics of Legal Injection, 62 ANALYSIS 181, 
189 (2002). 
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II. TRACING THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SAFE HARBORS 
 
Austin Sarat writes of capital punishment, “It is only in and through 
its claims to legitimacy that what law does is privileged and distinguished 
from ‘the violence that one always deems unjust.’”9  Since the origins of the 
death penalty, its claims to legitimacy have been grounded in ritualistic 
formalities and simulacra of humane treatment, in which physicians have 
taken a historically significant role.  Nowhere is the link between the 
medical profession and the technology of capital punishment more apparent 
than in the 1977 development of the modern lethal injection protocol by an 
Oklahoma medical examiner.  Although state lethal injection statutes 
generally require only limited participation by medical personnel, states in 
recent years have developed policies granting execution participants 
immunity from medical board discipline in an effort to encourage medical 
participation beyond the statutory requirements.  This Section explores the 
history of these disciplinary safe harbor policies. 
 
A.  Historical Perspectives on Medicine and Capital Punishment 
 
Early executions were conducted publicly, before crowds of 
spectators eager to take part in a communal ritual of punishment.10  In 
Michel Foucault’s words, “In the ceremonies of the public execution, the 
main character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was 
required for the performance.”11  While similar attitudes prevailed in the 
early stages of the American republic, support for public executions began 
to wane in the late nineteenth century.12  In the past century, capital 
punishment has become one of the most concealed parts of the American 
penal process – carried out behind prison walls, witnessed by only a select 
few, and designed to separate the condemned from even the executioner 
himself by a physical barrier.13  As public observation, which had long 
                                                 
9 Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Fact of Legal, Political, and Cultural Life: An 
Introduction, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
CULTURE, 7 (Austin Sarat, ed., 1999). 
10 John Laurence, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 183 (The Citadel Press 1960); 
John D. Bessler, DEATH IN THE DARK: PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA, 23-27 (1997).   
11 Michel Foucault, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH; THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, 58 (2nd ed. 
1995); see also Louis P. Masur, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, 103 (1989) (writing, of public 
executions in eighteenth century America: “Assembled as one, the spectators provide a 
reminder that the public execution is designed for the crowd, an image that the community 
is united … The criminal seems hardly to matter at all.”). 
12 Masur, supra note 11, at 93-116; Robert Johnson, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE 
MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS, 262 (1998); Bessler, supra note 10, at 40-44.   
13 Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment, in THE KILLING STATE, 
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served as a check on the legitimacy of the execution process, became less 
common, greater emphasis was placed on formal procedures that could 
serve to standardize and legitimize the process in the absence of direct 
public oversight.14  The most significant of these procedures (which include 
the selection of witnesses and the incorporation of humanizing rituals such 
as the last cigarette) is the technology of capital punishment itself, which 
has developed over the years to satisfy evolving societal standards.15 
While the medical community as a whole has taken no formal role 
in the advancement of capital punishment, individual physicians have 
played significant parts in the development of execution technologies.  
Historians have concluded that even the techniques used in hanging, one of 
the most frequently used execution methods in modern history,16 were 
perfected by early executioners only after consultation with “medical 
men.”17  One of the most prominent historical examples of the ties between 
medicine and capital punishment is the development of the guillotine by 
Drs. Antoine Louis and Joseph Guillotin at the start of the French 
Revolution.18 
Medical professionals had similarly significant roles in developing 
and implementing the technology of capital punishment in modern 
America.  As early as 1848, writers suggested that the United States, as a 
civilized and refined society, should use advances in medical and scientific 
technology to spare condemned prisoners excessive pain and mental 
anguish.19  When New York State created a Commission on Capital 
                                                                                                                            
supra note 9, at 227-28; Masur, supra note 11, at 162-63; see also Foucault, supra note 11, 
at 9-10 ("[T]he execution itself is like an additional shame that justice is ashamed to 
impose on the condemned man; so it keeps its distance from the act, tending always to 
entrust it to others, under the seal of secrecy."). 
14 But see Sarat, supra note 9, at 6 (positing that the primary benefit of such practices 
is to obfuscate, by way of fetishization, an underlying recognition that “law's violence” 
ultimately “bears substantial traces of the violence it is designed to deter and punish”).   
15 The dissemination of information about executions by the press has also served as an 
additional means of public oversight. See Masur, supra note 11, at 110, 115-16 (addressing 
the media’s impact on public conceptions of executions). 
16 See Laurence, supra note 10, at 41-42; Commission Report, infra note 20, at 34-35. 
17 Laurence, supra note 10, at 44-48 (identifying a “medical man’s” suggestion that 
nooses be tied “beneath the ear and pulled fairly tight” as one of the more important 
changes in “the hangman’s art”).   
18 Advocates of the guillotine hoped that this “simple mechanism” (operated without 
discretion by an impartial and respected agent of the government) would be an 
improvement over earlier methods of execution, such as hanging, which were criticized as 
inhumane and disgraceful to victims and their families.  See generally, Daniel Arasse, THE 
GUILLOTINE AND THE TERROR, 11-29 (1987); Arthur Isak Applbaum, Professional 
Detachment: The Executioner of Paris, 109 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1995) (examining the role 
morality of the profession of executioner). 
19 See G. W. Peck, On the Use of Chloroform in Hanging, 8 AM. WHIG REV. 283, 296 
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Punishment in the late nineteenth century to evaluate alternatives to 
hanging, it surveyed “a large number of the members of the medical 
profession” on the physiology of various execution methods and their 
attendant challenges.20  The surveyed physicians typically favored 
electrocution over the other alternatives considered, including lethal 
injection, the guillotine and shooting.21 The conclusions in the 
Commission’s comprehensive 1888 report were based largely on these 
professional opinions; indeed, the Commission cited as its sole reason for 
rejecting lethal injection as an execution technique the medical profession’s 
opposition to the practice.22   
Ultimately, the Commission recommended that electrocution, a 
method initially proposed by a Buffalo dentist,23 be adopted as New York’s 
                                                                                                                            
(Sept. 1848).  Peck writes: 
Our ancestors abolished torture. . . ; why should we not, now that science has 
found a means of alleviating extreme physical suffering, follow their example by 
allowing the benefit of it to the miserable wretches whom we simply wish to cast 
contemptuously out of existence?  If we have a right to hang a man at noon-day . . 
. then it follows that we have a right to give him Chloroform at noon-day, and 
hang him immediately afterwards, while under its operation . . . By this means we 
avoid for him, not only the pain of the actual killing, but the agonizing instant of 
certain apprehension. 
20 New York State Commission on Capital Punishment, Report of the Commission to 
Investigate and Report the Most Humane and Practical Method of Carrying Into Effect the 
Sentence of Death in Capital Cases: Transmitted to the Legislature, January 17, 1888, at 86 
(1888) [hereinafter, Commission Report]. 
21 Id.  Consider, for example, the response of one New York physician, who opined of 
electrocution, “It is a most admirable substitute [to hanging], probably the best known to 
science, fulfilling all the indications in the most humane, practical and painless manner.” 
Id. at 89. 
22 The Commission noted: 
[T]he injection of a violent and sudden poison, such as prussic acid, by means 
of the hypodermic needle, into the body of the condemned . . . is open to the very 
serious objection that the use of that instrument is so associated with the practice 
of medicine, and as a legitimate means of alleviating human suffering, that it is 
hardly deemed advisable to urge its application for the purposes of legal 
executions against the almost unanimous protest of the medical profession. 
Id. at 78.  Similar objections were cited by the British Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment in 1953.  Melvin V. Wingersky, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-1953): A Review, 44 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 695, 714 (1954) 
(noting that the British Medical Association “vigorously protested any member performing 
[lethal injection] or instructing lay persons in the techniques.”) 
23 After witnessing the death of a man who accidentally touched a live electrical 
generator, Dr. Alfred Southwick, a former engineer, reportedly described the episode to a 
state senator; the Commission was appointed shortly thereafter.  Arden G. Christen and 
Joan A. Christen, Alfred P. Southwick, MDS, DDS: Dental Practitioner, Educator and 
Originator of Electrical Executions, 48 J. HIST. DENTISTRY 117, 118-19 (Nov. 2000). 
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primary method of capital punishment.24  More than ten physicians attended 
the first electrocution to observe the workings of the new technology,25 one 
of whom later opined that electrocution is “the most humane, decent, and 
scientific method of inflicting the death penalty because of its efficiency, 
quickness, and painlessness,” and recommended that it be adopted by 
“every state in the Union.”26   
The execution of prisoners by lethal gas was first proposed by a 
physician in 1878,27 but it was not until forty years later, when a major in 
the U.S. Army Medical Corps developed the technology for use in prison 
populations,28 that Nevada became the first state to adopt it as an execution 
method.29  When a prisoner challenged Nevada’s lethal gas statute on 
constitutional grounds, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld it, citing the fact 
that gas had already been in use “for many years” by dentists and 
veterinarians, and finding that the legislature adopted the statute so as to 
“provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in the most humane 
                                                 
24 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 95.  The new law went into effect in 1889, 
and required the presence of two physicians at each execution by electrocution. Laurence, 
supra note 10, at 64.  The first prisoner subject to the law’s provisions challenged his 
punishment on Eighth Amendment grounds, but was unsuccessful.  In re Kemmler, 10 
S.Ct. 930, 933 (1890) (refusing to reexamine the New York court’s holding in favor of the 
electrocution statute). 
25 One news report of the time identified eleven physician witnesses by name.  Far 
Worse than Hanging – Kemmler’s Death Proves an Awful Spectacle – The Electric Current 
Had to be Turned on Twice Before the Deed was Fully Accomplished, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1890, at 1 [hereinafter, Far Worse than Hanging].  However, modern accounts report that at 
least fourteen physicians attended.  The American College of Physicians et al., BREACH OF 
TRUST: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, at 9-10 (1994) 
[hereinafter, Breach of Trust]. 
26 Edward Anthony Spitzka, Observations Regarding the Infliction of the Death 
Penalty by Electricity, Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y (Jan.-Apr. 1908), at 46;  See also, The 
Kemmler Execution – Dr. C.E. Spitzka Tells Doctors and Lawyers All About It – A Paper 
Read Before the Society of Medical Jurisprudence Last Night – Death Instantaneous, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1890, at 2 [hereinafter, The Kemmler Execution].  Note that Dr. Spitzka 
was more than a mere observer during the Kemmler execution.  According to his own 
statements and contemporaneous reports, Dr. Spitzka examined Kemmler after the initial 
current was applied, instructed that that the current be turned on again quickly after the first 
current failed to execute him, and pronounced Kemmler’s death.  The Kemmler Execution; 
Far Worse than Hanging, supra note 25, at 1.   
27 Annulla Linders, The Execution Spectacle and State Legitimacy: The Changing 
Nature of the American Execution Audience, 1833-1937, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 607, 636, 
n. 17 (2002). 
28 See Anne Krueger and David Hasemyer, Debate Rages Anew Over Gas Chamber, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, April 17, 1992, at A3; Jacob Weisberg, This Is Your Death -- 
Capital Punishment: What Really Happens, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at 26. 
29 Raymond Hartmann, The Use of Lethal Gas in Nevada Executions, 8 ST. LOUIS L. 
REV. 164, 165-66 (1922-23).  
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manner known to modern science.”30  The physicians and scientists who 
attended the prisoner’s 1924 execution unanimously pronounced the use of 
lethal gas to be “a swift and painless method" of execution, perhaps the 
"most merciful form yet devised."31 
 
B.  Developing and Legislating the Lethal Injection Procedure 
 
Like the guillotine and electric chair, lethal injection – a method of 
capital punishment that relies on intravenous injection of one or more lethal 
drugs – was developed by a medical professional.  The first steps were 
taken in 1976, when Bill Wiseman, an Oklahoma legislator, began 
researching the possibility of a more humane method of execution than the 
current standard, electrocution.32  Although both Wiseman’s personal 
physician33 and the Oklahoma Medical Association34 declined to provide 
guidance, citing ethical concerns, Oklahoma's state medical examiner, Dr. 
Jay Chapman, offered technical assistance.35  Dr. Chapman suggested “a 
lethal injection consisting of an ultra-short-acting barbiturate in 
combination with a chemical paralytic.”36  Dr. Stanley Deutsch, chair of the 
Oklahoma Medical School Anesthesiology Department, who later reviewed 
Dr. Chapman’s proposal, concluded that the method would be a “rapidly 
pleasant way of producing unconsciousness” leading to death.37   
In 1977, the Oklahoma legislature adopted lethal injection as the 
state’s execution method.  The statute, which mirrored the language used by 
Dr. Chapman in his initial recommendation, provided that “the punishment 
of death  . . . be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a 
lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a 
chemical paralytic agent until death is pronounced by a licensed physician 
according to accepted standards of medical practice.”38  There is no 
evidence to suggest that legislators consulted any other medical experts 
                                                 
30 State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 681-82 (Nev. 1923). 
31 Gas Kills Convict Almost Instantly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1924, at 15 (identifying Drs. 
A. Huftaker, E.E. Hamer, and Major D.A. Turner of Army Medical Reserve Corps as the 
official physician witnesses to the execution); see also, Nevada Will Execute Slayer by Gas 
Today, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1924, at 4 (noting that several physicians and “chemical 
experts” first tested Nevada’s gas chamber on two cats).  
32 Don Oldenburg, Poison Penalty: Bill Wiseman Drafted the Law Allowing Lethal 
Injections, Then Lived to Regret It, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 7, 2003, at D1. 
33 Id. at D1. 
34 So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections in the United States, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH 1, 14 (2006) [hereinafter, So Long as They Die]. 
35 Id. at 14; Oldenburg, supra note 32, at D1; 
36 So Long as They Die, supra note 34, at 14. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 14; 22 OKL. STAT. ANN. §1014(A) (1991) (enacted as Laws 1977, c. 41, § 1). 
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besides Drs. Chapman and Deutch before adopting either the Oklahoma 
statute or the Department of Corrections protocols, which later included the 
addition of a third drug, potassium chloride, pursuant to Dr. Chapman’s 
recommendation.39  Nearly every state that subsequently approved lethal 
injection as an execution method modeled its protocol after Oklahoma’s 
without further research or inquiry, leading Deborah Denno, a leading 
scholar in this area, to suggest that in developing the three-drug protocol, 
Dr. Chapman “effectively set the final drug framework for all future lethal 
injection executions.”40   
In designing the modern lethal injection procedure, Dr. Chapman 
had imagined that the process “would be carried out by people with enough 
medical training to start intravenous lines, mix and measure the drugs, and 
give them in the right order.”41  Given that these skills, unlike the skills 
necessary for earlier execution methods, have traditionally been ascribed to 
the medical domain, Dr. Chapman’s expectations as to the executioners’ 
qualifications were by no means unreasonable.42  However, when state 
criminal procedure statutes and department of corrections procedures were 
revised to reflect the adoption of lethal injection, they were surprisingly 
vague about the expected level of participation by medical personnel.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to reach some general conclusions about how 
legislators envisioned the process by parsing some of the more common 
                                                 
39 Id. at 14-15; Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 74. The three-drug protocol that was 
ultimately adopted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections is still in use throughout 
the country today. The first drug, sodium thiopental (Pentothal), is a short-acting 
barbiturate used in the clinical setting for general anesthesia; depending on the dosage, its 
effects range from mild sedation to medically induced coma. The second drug, 
pancuronium bromide (Pavulon), is a paralytic agent traditionally used in surgery to lower 
blood pressure, induce muscle flaccidity, and facilitate insertion of a breathing tube.  
Experts agree that if a prisoner is not fully anesthetized during the lethal injection process, 
administration of pancuronium bromide would result in paralysis and the sensation of 
asphyxiation, although the prisoner would still be able to feel pain and other sensations.  
The third drug, potassium chloride, stops the heart.  When administered at full strength, it 
causes excruciating pain as it travels through the bloodstream; accordingly, in clinical 
settings, it is only used in a dilute form.  See generally, Mark Heath, The Medicalization of 
Execution, in PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS (Robert B. Greifinger, ed. 2007); see also 
Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 
THE LANCET 1412 (April 16, 2005) (analyzing the implications of post-mortem sodium 
thiopental concentrations from prisoner toxicology reports).  
40 Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 74, 78-79.  
41 Denise Grady, Doctors See Way to Cut Suffering in Executions, N.Y. TIMES, June 
23, 2006.  
42 Compare the skills involved in lethal injection (securing venous access, preparing 
prescription drugs, administering drugs, and monitoring anesthetic depth) with those 
involved in other execution methods, such as hanging (knot-tying), electrocution (electrical 
expertise, application of electrodes), and firing squad (marksmanship).    
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statutory language. In particular, three common statutory elements suggest 
an expectation on the part of legislators that physicians, though present at 
executions to observe or provide indirect support and supervision, would 
not actually be the ones to prescribe or prepare medications, secure venous 
access, or administer the injections.   
First, while lethal injection statutes permitted or required that one or 
more physicians attend the execution as witnesses, they generally did not 
impose upon those physicians any direct responsibilities beyond declaring 
or certifying death.43  Most statutes granted great discretion to correctional 
directors in selecting an execution team with appropriate qualifications and 
training to administer the injection,44 and none required that the execution 
team include licensed medical personnel.45  The specific details of any 
direct involvement by medical personnel (including physicians, nurses, and 
medical technicians) were delineated, if at all, in internal Department of 
Corrections procedures.46  To the extent that physicians did participate in 
                                                 
43 See generally, Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 17-21 and 49-72; Christopher J. 
Levy, Conflict of Duty: Capital Punishment Regulations and AMA Medical Ethics, 26 J. 
LEG. MED. 261, 265-66 (2005).  
44 However, many statutes were silent as to the medical qualifications of executioners 
and attendees.  See Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 17-21 and 49-72; Levy, supra note 
43, at 166; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling 
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About 
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 121-23, 156-68 (2002) [hereinafter, Denno 2002] (noting that only 
39% of states’ lethal injection protocols mention executioner “training,” “competency,” 
“practice,” or “preparation”).  
45 Id.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN., § 46-19-103(5), (6) (2007) (providing that 
executions must be performed by someone “selected by the warden and trained to 
administer a lethal injection;” that person “need not be” a licensed medical practitioner); 
S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-32 (2007) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. § 630:5(XV) (2007) 
(same).  In fact, three states explicitly prohibited direct medical involvement in the 
execution process.  See KY. REV. STAT. § 431.220(3) (2008) (“No physician shall be 
involved in the conduct of an execution except to certify cause of death provided that the 
condemned is declared dead by another person.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/119-5(d)(5) (2008) (providing that the Department of Corrections “shall not request, 
require, or allow a health care practitioner licensed in Illinois” to participate in an 
execution); N.J. STAT. ANN 2C:49-3(b) (repealed Dec. 17, 2007) (“The commissioner shall 
designate persons who are qualified to administer injections and who are familiar with 
medical procedures, other than licensed physicians, as execution technicians[.]”). 
46 See Denno 2002, supra note 44, at 121-23, 156-68.  Oklahoma’s statute, for 
example, merely provides that a physician be “invited” to an execution, but its correctional 
procedures require that the physician order the necessary prescriptions and inspect the 
catheter and monitoring equipment.  Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 18.  Note, however, 
that increasingly restricted public access to lethal injection procedures makes it difficult to 
determine the extent of any required medical involvement.  Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 
95-96 (reporting that states surveyed about their lethal injection procedures “provided as 
little information about their protocols as possible.”). 
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the lethal injection process, it was typically on an ad hoc basis rather than as 
a result of planned procedures or legal requirements.47 
Second, many of the statutes include exclusionary clauses providing 
that lethal injection procedures do not constitute the practice of medicine as 
defined by state professional practice acts.  The Delaware statute, for 
example, specifies that administration of lethal substances in accordance 
with the act “shall not be construed to be the practice of medicine.”48  Other 
states further extended this exclusion to the “prescription, preparation, 
compounding, dispensing, and administration” of lethal substances, 
providing that such activities fell outside the practice of not only medicine, 
but also nursing, pharmacy, and other licensed medical professions.49  In all, 
more than a dozen states formally exempted direct involvement in lethal 
injection from the scope of medical practice, suggesting a legislative intent 
to mark a clear distinction between the practice of medicine and the practice 
of capital punishment.50 
Finally, many statutes authorize pharmacists to dispense the drugs 
used in the lethal injection process to correctional facility directors and 
                                                 
47 Indeed, this seems to have been the case at the first execution by lethal injection, 
which took place in Texas in 1982.  Before the execution, prison authorities stated that, 
apart from pronouncing the death of the prisoner, no physicians would be involved in the 
execution. See Robert Reinhold, Technician Executes Murderer in Texas by Lethal 
Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1982.  Although a “medical technician” was the one to 
actually administer the lethal injection, Dr. Ralph Gray, the Texas Department of 
Correction medical director, played a more direct role than initially anticipated.  Dr. Gray 
admitted that he and his staff “had assisted in preparations for the execution,” and that the 
medical technicians and drug supplies used during the procedure were under his control. Id.  
According to his own account, Dr. Gray examined the prisoner on the morning of the 
execution to determine if his veins were large enough to accommodate the catheter needle 
that would be used during the execution.  Robert Reinhold, Technician Executes Murderer 
in Texas by Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1982.  Finally, when called to pronounce 
death, Dr. Gray found that the prisoner was still alive, and suggested waiting longer for the 
drugs to take effect. Elizabeth Weil, The Needle and the Damage Done, N.Y. TIMES, 
February 11, 2007; Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 10. 
48 11 Del. Code § 4209(f) (2007). 
49 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(f) (2007). 
50 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-53 (2007); 11 DEL. CODE § 4209(f) (2007); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-2716 (2007); OREG. REV. STAT. § 137.473(2) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
630:5(XVI) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED. LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2007); WYO. STAT. 
§ 7-13-904(a) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.377(6) (2007); MD. CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES CODE ANN. § 3-905(b)(1) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-80-108(b) (2007); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 922.105(6) (2007); Ga. Code. Ann. § 17-10-38(c) (2007); ALA. CODE 
§ 15-18-82.1(f) (2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-5(g) (repealed July 24, 2003); N.J. 
STAT. ANN 2C:49-3(a) (repealed Dec. 17, 2007); see also Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen et al, 
2004 WL 2246227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the state’s lethal injection protocols 
are exceptions to and fall outside of state medical licensing statutes and drug and pharmacy 
acts); aff’d, 181 S.W. 3d 292 (Tenn. 2005); cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 2288 (2006). 
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executioners without a prescription.51  Delaware’s statute, for example, 
provides that “any pharmacist or pharmaceutical supplier is authorized to 
dispense drugs to the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee, 
without prescription” for the purpose of carrying out a lethal injection.52  
Such language suggests an understanding on the part of legislators that 
prison directors and officers, rather than licensed physicians, would be 
obtaining and preparing the lethal drugs.53 
Reading these statutory provisions as a whole suggests an 
expectation on the part of legislators that physician participation would not 
be necessary to accomplish the most essential elements of the lethal 
injection procedure.  Rather, prison officials and unlicensed personnel 
would be responsible for obtaining the necessary drugs, inserting the 
intravenous lines, and administering the injections.  A physician, however, 
would generally be in attendance to determine the time of death, and, 
presumably, provide indirect support or oversight if needed.  While limited 
legislative history makes it difficult to determine precisely why legislators 
envisioned the process in this manner, one reason may be because they were 
reluctant to make significant changes to existing personnel requirements.  
Executions by hanging, lethal gas, and electrocution were generally 
conducted by prison wardens and guards, and the continued use of such 
unlicensed personnel for lethal injection would certainly offer greater 
flexibility than requiring the involvement of physicians or other licensed 
medical providers.54  It is possible that legislators, while perhaps unaware of 
the early ethical guidance against physician participation, sought to forestall 
the possibility that executions might be delayed if physicians were unable or 
unwilling to participate.  Alternatively, perhaps legislators hoped to preempt 
concerns that unlicensed prison personnel, in selecting injection sites, 
starting intravenous lines, or preparing and administering the lethal drug 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-53 (2007); 11 DEL. CODE § 4209(f) (2007); 
IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (2007); OREG. REV. STAT. § 137.473(3) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 630:5(XVI) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 453.377(6) (2007); MD. CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CODE ANN. § 3-905(b)(2) 
(2008); 61 PA. STAT. § 3004(b) (2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-5(h) (2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15-187 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:49-3(a) (repealed Dec. 17, 2007). 
52 11 DEL. CODE § 4209(f) (2007). 
53 Indeed, at the first execution by lethal injection, the prison warden was responsible 
for preparing the lethal drugs; it was as a result of his error in preparation that the drugs 
precipitated into a thick sludge, rendering the first catheter unusable.  See Weil, supra note 
47; Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 10; see also John Kifner, Man Who Killed 33 Is 
Executed in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2004 (reporting that John Wayne Gacy’s 
execution was delayed “because gelling prevented the chemicals from flowing through a 
delivery tube.”) 
54 See generally, Johnson, supra note 12, at 125-139. 
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cocktail, might be engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine.55   
 
C.  Responses to Threats of Professional Discipline  
 
In 1980, just three years after Oklahoma and Texas adopted the first 
lethal injection statutes (but still two years before the first execution by 
lethal injection), the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association 
(“AMA”) proposed a policy on physician participation in capital 
punishment.  Prompted by inquiries from its membership about permissible 
involvement in the process of lethal injection, the Judicial Council 
recommended adoption of a policy that, while an individual’s opinion on 
capital punishment is her “personal moral decision,” physicians, as 
members of “a profession dedicated to preserving life where there is hope of 
doing so,” should not participate in legally authorized executions.56  This 
policy was formalized in the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics and has been 
periodically updated based on recommendations by the Council for Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs.57  
The AMA defines physician participation in capital punishment as 
any action that would “directly cause the death of the condemned,” would 
“assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to 
directly cause the death of the condemned,” or could “automatically cause 
an execution to be carried out on a condemned prisoner.”58  Prohibited 
actions include prescribing, preparing, or administering drugs that are part 
of the execution process; selecting injection sites; starting intravenous lines; 
monitoring vital signs; providing technical advice; consulting with or 
supervising lethal injection personnel; and “attending or observing an 
execution as a physician.”59  A physician is, however, permitted to attend an 
execution in a “totally nonprofessional capacity” (for example, as a 
community witness) and may certify the prisoner’s death if death has 
                                                 
55 Though exclusionary statutes effectively immunize unlicensed personnel from being 
charged with the unlicensed practice of medicine, they do not speak to the disciplinary 
implications, if any, of physician involvement.  While some have argued that exclusionary 
statutes effectively prohibit physician discipline, Lerman, supra note 7, at 1950-52, this is 
not the case.  Medical boards have the authority to discipline physicians for a variety of 
activities falling outside the scope of medical practice, including, among others, sexual 
contact with patients, fraud, substance abuse, and criminal activity.  See Barry Furrow et al, 
HEALTH LAW, at 82-83 (2nd ed. 2000). 
56 American Medical Association Judicial Council, Capital Punishment (1980), 
reported in House of Delegates Proceedings (Chicago, IL, July 20-24, 1980), 129th Annual 
Convention, pp. 85-86 [hereinafter, AMA Report 1980]. 
57 American Medical Association Opinion 2.06, Capital Punishment (issued July 1980; 
updated June 1994, June 1996, December 1999, and June 2000).   
58 Id.   
59 Id.   
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already been declared by a third party.60  Nearly every major medical 
association and human rights organization in the U.S. and abroad has an 
analogous policy.61   
In brief, the AMA’s ethical arguments62 against physician 
participation in capital punishment are grounded in concerns that it violates 
the Hippocratic Oath and undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the 
practice of medicine in the eyes of the public.63 The principle of primum 
                                                 
60 Id.   
61 The American Society of Anesthesiologists has one of the most carefully drafted 
such policies, which provides:  
Execution by lethal injection has resulted in the incorrect association of 
capital punishment with the practice of medicine, particularly anesthesiology. 
Although lethal injection mimics certain technical aspects of the practice of 
anesthesia, capital punishment in any form is not the practice of medicine.  
Because of ancient and modern principles of medical ethics, legal execution 
should not necessitate participation by an anesthesiologist or any other physician.  
ASA continues to agree with the position of the American Medical Association on 
physician involvement in capital punishment. ASA strongly discourages 
participation by anesthesiologists in executions. 
STATEMENT ON PHYSICIAN NONPARTICIPATION IN LEGALLY AUTHORIZED EXECUTIONS 
(2006) [hereinafter, ASA Policy].  See also American Psychiatric Association Position 
Statement No. 200125, Medical Participation in Capital Punishment (1980); American 
College of Physicians, Relation of the Physician to the Government, in its Ethics Manual 
(5th Ed. 2005); Society of Correctional Physicians, Code of Ethics (adopted 1997, amended 
1998); American Public Health Association, Participation of Health Professionals in 
Capital Punishment, 91 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 520 (2001) (reaffirming Position Statement 
No. 8521 (1985)); National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, Position 
Statement on EMT and Paramedic Participation in Capital Punishment (June 9, 2006); 
American Academy of Physician Assistants, Guidelines For Ethical Conduct for the 
Physician Assistant Profession, at 9 (adopted 2000, amended 2004, 2006, and 2007); 
American Nurses Association, Position Statement: Nurses' Participation in Capital 
Punishment (1999); International Council of Nurses, Position Statement: Death Penalty 
and Participation by Nurses in Execution (1998, revised 2003 and 2006); UN International 
Code of Medical Ethics, Proposed Guidelines for Practice in Difficult Settings: Guideline 
No. 10; World Medical Association, Resolution on Physician Participation in Capital 
Punishment, Adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly Lisbon, Portugal.  
62 The AMA has also challenged physician participation on purely logistical grounds, 
arguing that nurses, technicians, physician assistants, and even unlicensed prison personnel 
may in fact be able to perform executions procedures safely and effectively.  AMA 1980, 
supra note 56.  See also Baum, infra note 154, at 57-58; Caplan, infra note 209; Lanier, 
infra note 209.  However, this position does not acknowledge that the codes of professional 
ethics applicable to nurses, emergency medical technicians, and physician assistants all 
include prohibitions on participation in executions similar to those made by the AMA.  See 
supra note 61.   
63 Most of the AMA’s ethical arguments opposing physician participation in capital 
punishment are not dependent on opposition by AMA delegates or the profession generally 
to capital punishment.  Even those physicians who support the death penalty may believe 
that, as a professional matter, it is inappropriate for medical providers to be involved.  For 
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non nocere (“First, do no harm”) and the standards set forth in the 
Hippocratic Oath require that physicians use their medical skills and 
training to alleviate pain and prolong life.64  According to the AMA, 
physician participation in executions causes harm, rather than alleviating 
suffering, and so “contradicts the dictates of the profession.”65  Moreover, 
the use of medical skills and technology in the context of an execution 
procedure that mimics clinical practice presents the public with a conceptual 
contradiction.66  Such a “perversion” of the physician’s role allegedly 
distorts societal understandings of the medical profession, undermines 
professional credibility, and leads to a loss of public trust.67   
Although the AMA’s opinions and policies are merely advisory, 
most state medical practice acts authorize board discipline of physicians 
who engage in unprofessional conduct or violate ethical norms,68 terms 
which are defined in part by reference to the AMA’s policies.  Consider, for 
                                                                                                                            
articles citing professional norms as grounds for opposition, see, e.g., William J. Curran & 
Ward Casscells, The Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital Punishment by Intravenous 
Drug Injection, 302 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 226 (Jan. 24, 1980); Peter A. Clark, Physician 
Participation in Executions: Care Giver or Executioner?, 34 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 95 
(2006); Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The Consequences of Overriding 
Professional Ethics, 6 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 351 (2006).  However, at 
least some physicians who have spoke out against the practice do so on the basis of 
opposition to the death penalty generally. Consider, for example, Dr. Arthur Zitrin, the 
self-described “death penalty abolitionist” who initiated a Georgia inquiry into physician 
involvement in executions.  Carlos Campos, Doctors’ Role in Executions Debated, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 1, 2005, at A1.  See infra notes 94-98, and accompanying text. 
64 However, physicians are generally not prohibited from taking harmful actions that 
do not involve medical training or expertise – for example, sitting as jurors in capital 
sentencing cases, or acting as public officials.  Consider, for example, Kentucky governor 
Ernie Fletcher, a licensed physician, who in 2004 signed a death warrant for a convicted 
killer and was challenged before the state medical board.  The board determined that he did 
not violate ethical standards because he was acting as a governor, rather than a physician, 
when he signed the warrant. Deborah Yetter, Ethics Complaint is Dismissed; Foes of 
Execution Challenged Fletcher, COURIER-J., Jan. 14, 2005, at 1B. 
65 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician Participation in Capital 
Punishment (adopted December 1992), 270 JAMA 365 (July 21, 1993) [hereinafter AMA 
CEJA Policy]; see also Dworkin, supra note 8, at 182-3; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (noting that physician-assisted suicide could “undermine the trust that 
is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between 
healing and harming”). 
66 ASA Policy, supra note 61. 
67 AMA CEJA Policy, supra note 65.  See also M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties 
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA: 268, 272 (Jan. 20, 1999); Edmund D. 
Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: the Physician's Dilemma of Divided 
Loyalty, 16 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 371, 373 (1993); Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 
38; Dworkin, supra note 8, at 185 (referring to the impermissibility of “the healing hand 
acting as the hurting hand”). 
68 See Furrow, supra note 55, at 82-83. 
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example, Ohio’s Medical Practice Act, which requires that the state medical 
board “keep on file current copies of the codes of ethics of the various 
national professional organizations” and provides that the board “shall” 
discipline or limit the right to practice of a medical provider for “violation 
of any provision of a code of ethics of the American [M]edical 
[A]ssociation . . . or any other national professional organizations that the 
board specifies by rule.”69  It is on the basis of the AMA’s policies that, 
starting in the mid-1990’s, medical providers and human rights 
organizations began petitioning state medical boards to take disciplinary 
action against physician participants in executions.70 
Evidence suggests that, until the late 1990’s, state corrections 
departments had little difficulty finding qualified personnel to participate in 
executions.  Physicians and nurses were routinely involved in the process of 
lethal injection, though their participation was generally kept out of the 
public eye and under the AMA’s radar.  In March of 1994, the American 
College of Physicians released a report titled Breach of Trust: Physician 
Participation in Executions in the Unites States, which documented the fact 
that physicians are “often directly involved” in executions by lethal 
injection and electrocution, “in violation of ethical and professional codes 
of conduct.”71  The Breach of Trust report also provided recommendations 
intended to “eliminate [the] conflict between medical ethics and the law” 
and “allow the medical profession to enforce its ethical guidelines” in the 
context of capital punishment.72  Among other things, the report 
recommended that state medical boards “define physician participation [in 
executions] as unethical conduct, and take appropriate action against 
physicians who violate ethical standards.”73  That same month, the 
                                                 
69 OHIO REV. STAT. 4731.22(B)(18) (2008).  
70 See, e.g., Gibbons et al v. Peters et al., No. 1-94-4453 (Ill. App. Mar. 16, 1996); 
Thorburn v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (Cal. App. 1998); Zitrin v. 
Georgia Composite State Board of Medical Examiners, Civ. No 2005–103905 (Ga. Super. 
Ct., July 28, 2006); N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Board, Civ. No. 07- 
003574 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2007). 
71 Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 3. The report cited examples of physicians 
attending preparatory briefings with the execution team, determining venous access, 
prescribing lethal drugs, observing the prisoner during the execution process, monitoring 
the EKG, assessing the prisoner’s level of consciousness with “medically accepted tests for 
reaction to pain,” determining whether death had occurred, and pronouncing death. Id. at 
21-25.  A more recent study of physician and nurse participants in executions confirmed 
their involvement in these activities and others, including placing IV and central lines, 
instructing that more drugs be given, and doing “dry runs” with the execution technicians. 
Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide - Why Physicians Participate in Executions, 
354 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1221, 1223-27 (2006). 
72 Breach of Trust, supra note 25, at 45. 
73 Id. at 46. 
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American Public Health Association (“APHA”), American College of 
Physicians, American Nurses Association, and AMA issued a joint 
statement calling upon state licensing and disciplinary boards to treat 
participation in executions as grounds for disciplinary action.74   
Just two months later, in May of 1994, four physicians and 
Physicians for Human Rights (one of the organizations that authored the 
Breach of Trust report) filed a complaint with the Illinois State Medical 
Disciplinary Board (the “Illinois Board”), requesting that the board 
investigate and discipline the physicians who were planning to participate in 
the scheduled execution of John Wayne Gacy.75  At the time the complaint 
was filed, the Illinois Execution of Death Statute required that a physician 
pronounce death at an execution.76 The complainants contended that any 
physician who did so at Gacy’s execution would be violating the Medical 
Practice Act by virtue of his “unethical conduct” and “involvement” in the 
administration of drugs “for other than a medically accepted therapeutic 
purpose.”77  Ultimately, the Illinois Board concluded that it had no authority 
to take disciplinary action, finding that the Execution of Death Statute 
evidenced the Illinois legislature’s policy determination “that there is no 
violation of the Medical Practice Act for a physician to pronounce the death 
of a defendant at an execution.”78 
Illinois was among the first states to adopt a statutory safe harbor 
amendment to its lethal injection statute.79  Proposed just one year after the 
Gibbons complaint was filed with the Illinois Board, the amendment 
provided that Section 22 of the Medical Practice Act, relating to discipline, 
“does not apply to persons who carry out or assist in the implementation of 
                                                 
74 APHA et al., "Health care professional participation in capital punishment: 
statement from professional societies regarding disciplinary action” (March 23, 1994), 
reprinted in APHA, Other Groups, Sign Letter Against Participation in Executions, 24 
NATION’S HEALTH 9 (1994). 
75 See Petition for Leave to Appeal, Gibbons v. Peters, No 95-78777 (Ill. Mar. 13, 
1995). 
76 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-5(a)(1) (1994). 
77 See Petition for Leave to Appeal, Gibbons v. Peters, supra note 75. 
78 Id.  The complainants then filed suit, seeking administrative review of the Illinois 
Board’s decision, as well as declarative and injunctive relief.  While the trial court initially 
remanded to the board for review and recommendation, the appeals court reversed without 
comment, leaving unchallenged the board’s decision not to investigate or initiate 
disciplinary action. Gibbons et al v. Peters et al., No. 1-94-4453 (Ill. App. Mar. 16, 1996).  
Although an opinion was supposed to follow the appellate court’s March 16 order, the 
passage of Illinois’ safe harbor statute on March 21 rendered the matter moot, and no 
opinion was issued.  Gacy’s execution took place as scheduled on May 10, 1994.   
79 The first state to create a safe harbor, albeit not by way of legislation, was Virginia.  
See 1994 VA. OP. ATTY. GEN. 85 (Apr. 26, 1994).   
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a court order effecting the provisions of [the Execution of Death Statute].”80  
Reportedly, the amendment was adopted “to head off attempts by opponents 
of the death penalty to delay executions.”81  However, because the 
amendment was passed hurriedly as part of a sweeping crime bill, there is 
no record of legislative debate or public discussion of the proposed safe 
harbor provision.82  It is perhaps for this reason that the safe harbor 
provision was challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, immediately after its 
passage by both physicians and legislators as an improper intrusion upon 
medical professionals’ autonomy.83   
During the same month that the Illinois statute was passed, Arkansas 
adopted similar legislation.84  While there had yet been no reported efforts 
in Arkansas to instigate disciplinary action against participants, board 
members of the Arkansas Department of Corrections were aware that 
professional and ethical concerns might limit the pool of physicians willing 
to assist in executions.  Although no official legislative history is 
available,85 news reports indicate that the safe harbor provision was 
proposed at a 1994 Department of Corrections board meeting during which 
a board member, Mary Parker (a professor of criminal justice at the 
University of Arkansas), informed the department of the AMA policy 
opposing physician participation.86  Prof. Parker raised the possibility that 
                                                 
80 P.A. 89-8, effective March 21, 1995 (adopted as 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/4(b)).  
81 Anita Srikameswaran and Christi Parsons, Doctors Assail Role In Execution, CHI. 
TRIB., June 20, 1995, at 3. 
82 Id.  The bill was introduced on January 13, 1994, and signed by the governor on 
March 21.  See Westlaw 1995 IL H.B. 204 (SN).  There were no public hearings, and 
legislative debates did not address disciplinary immunity for medical providers. 
83 See Srikameswaran and Parsons, supra note 81 (reporting that physicians at the 
1995 AMA meeting challenged the recently enacted statute); Sue Ellen Christian, 
Legislator Seeks to Bar Role for Doctors in Executions, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1995 at 7 
(reporting on a later bill to repeal the safe harbor).  The statute containing the safe harbor 
provision was ultimately repealed in 2003; however, based on the legislative history of the 
2003 amendments, legislators were not aware that repealing the statute might subject 
physicians to discipline for participating in executions.  See generally, Illinois 93 G.A. 
SENATE TRANSCRIPTS, March 19, 2003, at 75-78; May 9, 2003, at 117-119; Illinois 93 
G.A. House Transcript, March 13, 2003, at 74-79 . 
84 As adopted, the legislation provided that infliction of the death penalty pursuant to 
Arkansas’ lethal injection statute “shall not be construed to be the practice of medicine” 
and that a licensed medical professional’s assistance with an execution “shall not be cause 
for any disciplinary or corrective measures” by any state board or commission that 
oversees the practice of health professionals. Act 651, effective March 16, 1995 (adopted 
as ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-80-108(a) and (b)).   
85 Arkansas does not publish committee reports, committee prints, floor debate, or 
minutes of senate and house proceedings. 
86 Ray Pierce, Panel Delays Vote On Execution Methods, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, 
January 18, 1995, at 10B [hereinafter, Pierce, Panel Delays Vote].  
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physicians, in light of AMA policy and the professional oath to “do no 
harm,” might be unwilling to participate in lethal injections.87  In response 
to this concern, the Department initially considered abandoning lethal 
injection altogether in favor of electrocution, the state’s previous execution 
method,88 but ultimately drafted safe harbor legislation based on the 
language of a proposed Pennsylvania bill.89  Arizona90 and Oregon91 
followed suit, adopting safe harbor provisions in 1998 and 1999, 
respectively.92   
                                                 
87 Id. (reporting the state’s concern that it “could find itself unable to execute convicts 
in the future because of the reluctance of the medical community to participate in lethal 
injections”); Ray Pierce, Privatizing Moves State's Prison System Into New Era, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 14, 1995, at 6B [hereinafter, Pierce, Privatizing]. 
88 Pierce, Privatizing, supra note 87, at 6B (reporting that the Department considered 
the electrocution proposal to be “taking a step backward,” since lethal injection was 
considered by some to be “more humane”).  
89 Pierce, Panel Delays Vote, supra note 86, at 10B.  See also Frank Reeves, Bill 
Would Exclude Doctors From Executions, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 10, 1994, at A1 
(reporting that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections hoped to propose a bill 
containing exclusionary, safe harbor, and anonymity provisions). The Pennsylvania bill 
appears never to have been introduced.   
90 Arizona’s safe harbor, which was proposed as part of a larger bill addressing various 
correctional and education issues, provides, “If a person who participates or performs 
ancillary functions in an execution is licensed by a board, the licensing board shall not 
suspend or revoke the person's license as a result of the person's participation in an 
execution.”  Legis. Serv. Ch. 232 (H.B. 2144), effective March 16, 1995 (adopted as ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN § 13-704).   
91 Oregon’s safe harbor, which was proposed as part of a larger crime bill addressing 
post-conviction appeals, provides, “Any assistance rendered in an execution” carried out 
pursuant to law, whether by licensed or nonlicensed personnel, “is not cause for 
disciplinary measures or regulatory oversight by any board, commission or agency  . . . that 
oversees or regulates the practice of health care professionals[.]” 1999 Oregon Laws Ch. 
1055 (S.B. 392), effective Oct. 23, 1999 (adopted as OR. REV. STAT. § 137.476(2)).   
92 While there is no formal record of what triggered these legislative actions on the 
West Coast, the timing suggests they may have been prompted by a 1998 California 
challenge.  In Thorburn v. Department of Corrections, a group of California physicians 
sought an injunction against physician participation in executions on the grounds that such 
participation violates the unprofessional conduct provisions of the California Business and 
Professional Code.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents, medical 
and correctional officers at California Department of Corrections and San Quentin State 
Prison, and the appeals court affirmed, concluding that the California legislature did not 
intend to include physician participation in executions within the ambit of statutorily 
prohibited unprofessional conduct. Thorburn v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 
1284 (Cal. App. 1998).  In 2001, California enacted a law providing that a physician’s 
refusal to participate in an execution would not subject him to disciplinary action; however, 
the sponsor was clear to point out that the bill “does not seek to establish that such 
participation by a physician constitutes unprofessional conduct.” Senate Committee on 
Public Safety, Bill Analysis 2001-2002 Regular Session, S.B. 129 (Westlaw CA B.An., 
S.B. 129 Sen., 3/20/2001). 
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Although the APHA publicly reaffirmed its 1994 position statement 
in 2001,93 there appear to have been no further efforts at board discipline 
until several years later.  In 2004, a group of physicians in Georgia 
petitioned the state medical board to revoke the license of a Georgia 
physician who had testified as to his participation in state executions.94  
Though the board refused to sanction the physician, a decision which was 
upheld by a Georgia court,95 the Georgia Department of Corrections 
nevertheless proposed that the legislature adopt a safe harbor provision.96  
According to its sponsor, the bill was introduced because “there ha[d] been 
challenges to the licensure of people who participate” in executions since 
Georgia adopted its lethal injection protocol in 2001.97  In 2006, after 
passing 157-1 in the House and 46-1 in the Senate with no debate, the bill 
was signed into law.98    
That same year, Oklahoma legislators, concerned by the medical 
profession’s response to the California ruling in Morales v. Hickman,99 
passed a safe harbor statute of their own.100  Said the author of the 
Oklahoma statute, “This legislation will ensure activists cannot target 
doctors and nurses who participate in state-ordered executions” and will 
allow medical professionals to “participate in an execution without fear of 
retaliation by a medical board or organization.”101   
                                                 
93 APHA, Participation of Health Professionals in Capital Punishment, Policy No. 
200125 (Jan. 1, 2001). 
94 See Zitrin v. Georgia Composite State Board of Medical Examiners, Civ. No 2005–
103905 (Ga. Super. Ct., July 28, 2006); Campos, supra note 51, at A1.   
95 Id.  Despite not being sanctioned by the board, the physician stopped participating in 
executions, citing “harassment.”   
96 Nancy Badertscher, Legislature 2006: Bill would shield doctors at executions, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST, Feb. 17, 2006, at 12D. 
97 Id.  
98 The safe harbor bill had originally been proposed in 2005 but did not pass.  Campos, 
Doctors’ Execution Role Targeted, ATLANTA J.-CONST, June 2, 2005, at 1C; Campos, 
supra note 63, at A1. 
99 In Morales, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied an 
inmate’s request for a stay of execution on the condition that a qualified anesthesiologist be 
present during the course of the execution. Morales v. Hickman, 06-219, 06-926 (N.D. Ca., 
Feb. 14 2006), aff’d, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006). The two anesthesiologists who initially 
volunteered ultimately withdrew from involvement on ethical grounds shortly before the 
execution was to take place; when no colleagues stepped forward to take their place, the 
execution was effectively stayed pending a ruling on the constitutionality of California’s 
lethal injection procedures.  See Bob Egelko, Lethal Injection Hearing, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON. (Sept. 30, 2006). 
100 Oklahoma House News Releases, Feb. 23, 2006 and May 3, 2006 (noting that the 
bill was authored following the California “fiasco”).  The bill was signed by the governor 
only three months after its introduction.  2006 Bill Tracking OK H.B.2660.  
101 Oklahoma House News Release, Feb. 23, 2006 and May 3, 2006 (quoting State 
Rep. Paul Roan).  
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Professional responses to a similar court ruling in Missouri102 
prompted the 2007 passage of a Missouri statute that not only created a safe 
harbor from professional discipline for participation in a lawful execution 
but also provided execution team members with coverage under the state 
legal expense fund for any legal challenges to their conduct.103  Legislators 
expressed the hope that the safe harbor and anonymity provisions in the 
statute would protect “members of the execution team and their families 
from retaliation and ridicule” and from professional disciplinary action.104 
North Carolina is the most recent state to have created a disciplinary 
safe harbor policy.  In January 2007, the North Carolina Medical Board 
adopted a policy supporting discipline of physician participants in 
executions.105  In direct response to this policy, legislators from the House 
and the Senate proposed a bill that would have included both safe harbor 
and exclusionary provisions.106  While the legislative attempt ultimately 
failed, a ruling by the North Carolina Superior Court effectively created the 
same kind of safe harbor legislators sought.  In North Carolina Department 
of Corrections et al v. North Carolina Medical Board, the North Carolina 
Department of Corrections petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Medical Board, arguing that the Board had no authority to 
enforce its position statement on physician participation in executions.107  
The court concluded that the Board, in promulgating its position statement 
and declaring physician conduct “specifically authorized and required by 
law” to be unethical and subject to discipline, “improperly exceeded the 
                                                 
102 After a federal district court ordered Missouri to hire an anesthesiologist to oversee 
a scheduled execution, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG2006 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 
12, 2006), rev’d, Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007), state officials reported 
that they were unable to find one. Derek Kravitz, Bill Would Shield Execution Doctors’ 
Names, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2007, at B4; Editorial, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, May 29, 2007, at p. B6. 
103 MISSOURI STAT. § 546.720(4) (2007). 
104 Note that much of the legislative debate in Missouri addressed concerns about 
retaliation by prisoners, rather than medical boards.  For example, Department of 
Corrections spokesman Brian Hauswirth said that members of the execution team need to 
be protected from possible acts of retribution by the prisoners on death row, some of whom 
“are murderers who have committed heinous acts.”  Kravitz, supra note 102, at B4. 
105 The board took the position that “any physician who engages in any verbal or 
physical activity … that facilitates the execution,” beyond those activities specifically 
required by the criminal procedure statute, “may be subject to disciplinary action by this 
Board.”  North Carolina Board Position Statement, Capital Punishment (adopted Jan. 
2007). 
106 Andrea Weigl, Execution Impasse Unlikely to End Until Courts Rule, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Apr. 6, 2007,  at A1. 
107 N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Board, Civ. No. 07- 003574 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2007). 
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authority bestowed upon it to regulate the practice of medicine.”108  Holding 
that a “judicial execution is not a medical event or medical procedure and is 
outside the scope of [the Medical Practices Act],” the court granted the 
requested relief and rejected the Board’s claim to disciplinary authority.109  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently granted a petition for 
discretionary review of this matter.110  
The groundswell of safe harbor legislation and litigation over the 
past three years111 has brought to at least nine the number of states that 
effectively prohibit state medical boards from taking disciplinary action on 
the grounds of participation in lethal injection.112  Yet public and academic 
discussion of these safe harbor policies has been limited.  Before 
policymakers increase their reliance on safe harbors as mechanisms for 
facilitating medical involvement in executions, they ought to evaluate 
critically the justifications for and the implications of disciplinary safe 
harbor policies.   
 
III. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 
 
An informed policy analysis of capital punishment safe harbors must 
begin with an understanding of where in the legal landscape they are 
situated.  Fundamentally, safe harbor policies act as limitations on the scope 
of medical board authority in matters of discipline.  As such, their strength 
as a policy matter should be evaluated by reference to general principles of 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 661 S.E. 2d 736 (N.C. 2008). 
111 In 2006 and 2007, safe harbor legislation was proposed in four states (Georgia, 
Oklahoma, Missouri, North Carolina).  For relevant litigation, see Bowling et al v. Haas et 
al, Civ No. 3:07-cv-32 (E.D. Ky. June 7. 2007) (issuing order to show cause why prisoners’ 
complaint that lethal injection violates the FCSA and FDCA should not be dismissed); 
N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Board, Civ. No. 07-003574 (N.C. Super. Ct., 
Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that judicial executions are outside the scope of the Medical 
Practices Act and do not constitute medical procedures subject to Board review); Zitrin v. 
Georgia Composite State Board of Medical Examiners, Civ. No 2005–103905 (Ga. Super. 
Ct., July 28, 2006) (holding that Georgia law excludes execution from the practice of 
medicine and the Board was within its authority in refusing to open an investigation), aff’d, 
2007 WL 3025835 (Ga. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2007).   
112 See Virginia (1994 VA. OP. ATTY. GEN. 85, Apr. 26, 1994), Arkansas (Ark. Code 
Ann. § 17-80-108, effective March 16, 1995), California (Thorburn v. Dep’t of 
Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (Cal. App. 1998)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-704, effective Dec. 31, 1998), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 137.476, effective Oct. 23, 
1999), Georgia (see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-42.1, effective July 1, 2006), Oklahoma (59 
OKL. STAT. ANN. § 4001, effective Nov. 1, 2006), Missouri (MISSOURI STAT. § 546.720, 
approved June 30, 2007), and North Carolina (N.C. Dep’t of Corrections, Civ. No. 
07-003574). 
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medical regulation.  That is, safe harbors should be viewed not just as 
artifacts of the political discourse on capital punishment, but also as part of 
a historical narrative in which American states have traditionally delegated 
a great deal of autonomy to the medical profession -- and, more 
importantly, have granted state medical boards wide latitude in matters of 
licensure and discipline.   
 
A.  Self-Regulation and Professional Autonomy 
 
The principle of professional autonomy largely defines modern 
theories of professionalism.113  In a kind of social contract,114 the 
professions, on the basis of their members’ collective expertise and 
organized commitment to public service, are privileged with the authority to 
self-define and self-regulate in exchange for taking on responsibility for the 
provision of important social goods.115  The American approach towards the 
regulation of medicine is consistent with this understanding of 
professionalism.   
Regulation of the medical profession is justified by reference to the 
states’ police powers, which authorize state actions aimed at protecting the 
public’s health and welfare.116  While the modern system of American 
medical regulation can be most accurately described as a hybrid scheme that 
incorporates elements of self-regulation, private oversight, as well as 
administrative, statutory, and common law,117 direct government oversight 
                                                 
113 See generally, Wilbert E. Moore, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES, 6 (1970); 
Michael D. Bayles, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 9 (1988); William M. Sullivan, WORK AND 
INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA, 4-5 (2004); 
Richard L. Abel, AMERICAN LAWYERS, 37 (1989); Eliot Freidson, PROFESSION OF 
MEDICINE, 71-72 (1988). 
114 See Sullivan, supra note 113, at 2; William M. Sullivan, What Is Left of 
Professionalism after Managed Care?, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7, at 10-11 (Apr. 13, 
1999). 
115 See generally, Moore, supra note 113, at 6; Bayles, supra note 113, at 8-9; 
Sullivan, supra note 113, at 4-5, 9-10; Corinne Lathrop Gilb, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT, 53-54 (1966). 
116 U.S. Const. amend. X.  See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191-94 
(1898) (noting that “within the acknowledged reach of the police power, a State may 
prescribe the qualifications of one engaged in any business so directly affecting the lives 
and health of the people as the practice of medicine.”); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 
114, 122-23 (1889) (“The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its 
people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend 
to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of 
deception and fraud.”). 
117 See, e.g, Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L. J. 625, 
634-35 (2008) (noting that the “interests and relationships that health law centers on are 
protected by a myriad of legal forms and institutions,” including contract law, tort, federal 
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is rare in matters of licensing, credentialing, and discipline.  Instead, 
medical practice acts aimed at protecting the public from the 
“unprofessional, improper, incompetent, unlawful, fraudulent and/or 
deceptive” practice of medicine vest adjudicative and rulemaking authority 
in state medical boards. 118  These boards, which are composed primarily of 
licensed medical professionals (and some public members),119 are 
responsible for imposing standards for entry into the profession, 
establishing guidelines for ethical and competent practice, and enforcing 
those guidelines by way of discipline.120  Ultimately, the medical profession 
is given a significant degree of autonomy in determining how best to 
achieve the state’s interests in patient welfare and public health. 
There exists no reason why states could not oversee the details of 
professional practice more directly.  Indeed, given the importance of the 
goals with which the professions have been tasked (improving public 
health, for medicine; promoting justice, for law), one might question 
whether the delegation of professional regulation to autonomous or quasi-
autonomous administrative or private entities is a wise approach.  Though a 
full defense of this position is beyond the scope of this Article, three 
justifications are generally offered in support of this approach. 
First, professional self-regulation is likely to be, on the whole, more 
effective than direct government oversight in achieving the state’s patient 
welfare and public health goals.  Many scholars contend that professionals 
                                                                                                                            
and state statutes, and administrative regulations); Furrow, supra note 55, at 59 (noting that 
medical boards, while described as self-regulating, include lay members, are governed by 
procedures set by the legislature, and make decisions subject to judicial review); Thomas 
L. Greaney, Public Licensure, Private Certification, and Credentialing of Medical 
Professionals: An Antitrust Perspective, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONS, at 153-54 (discussing the “ubiquitous and influential role played by private 
entities” in the process of medical quality assurance), Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and 
Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002) (seeking to unify the disparate elements of medical 
regulation by reference to themes of therapeutic jurisprudence and trust). 
118 See generally, Furrow, supra note 55, at 59-60; Guide to the Essentials of a Modern 
Medical Practice Act, Tenth Edition, Approved by the House of Delegates of the 
Federation of State Medical Boards (April 2003); Elements of a Modern State Medical 
Board, Approved by the House of Delegates of the Federation of State Medical Boards 
(May 1998). 
119 Furrow, supra note 55, at 59-60; Carl F. Ameringer, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND 
THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROTECTION, 8 (1999).  While the members of the medical board 
are formally appointed by the governor, private medical associations have historically held 
significant power in the appointment process.  See Ronald L. Akers, The Professional 
Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 463, 471-72 
(1967). 
120 See generally, Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare 
Professionals, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS (Timothy S. Jost ed. 
1997).   
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with specialized training and expertise are more qualified than state 
legislators or administrators to weigh in on issues of technical competence 
within the profession.121  Although there is some question as to whether a 
self-regulated profession’s achievement of public goods is merely incidental 
to its focus on professional well-being, there is intuitive appeal to the idea 
that a profession’s specialized knowledge is valuable in setting professional 
regulation.122 
Second, professional self-regulation is typically more efficient than 
the alternative of direct state oversight.  It is generally far less burdensome 
for the state to delegate its regulatory powers to an administrative agency, 
particularly one with close ties to private professional associations, than to 
oversee the details of professional practice directly.123 Indeed, in the 
administrative law context, it is well-recognized that, for reasons of both 
efficacy and efficiency, a legislature in an increasingly complex society 
“simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives.”124 
There is also a third, somewhat more nuanced, justification for 
professional self-regulation – namely, that only a profession with a 
reasonable degree of independence and authority will be able to engender 
the public trust necessary for it to achieve its goals.125  
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Bayles, supra note 113, at 193; David Orentlicher, The Role of 
Professional Self-Regulation, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS, at 131, 
supra note 120.  Some also argue that professionals, by virtue of their specialized 
knowledge, are likewise more qualified to speak on matters of professional ethics.  See 
Robert M. Veatch, “Who Should Control the Scope and Nature of Medical Ethics?,” in 
Robert B. Baker et al., THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS REVOLUTION: HOW THE AMA'S 
CODE OF ETHICS HAS TRANSFORMED PHYSICIANS' RELATIONSHIPS TO PATIENTS, 
PROFESSIONALS, AND SOCIETY, 162-63 (1999) (describing the epistemological claim that 
while the ethical norms of a profession have their roots in a centralized morality, only 
members of the professional group can understand and articulate them); but see infra, note 
134. 
122 See Ronald L. Akers, The Professional Association and the Legal Regulation of 
Practice, 2 Law & Soc'y Rev. 463, 477-78 (1967) (noting that, while laws regulating 
medical practice “are not so much legislated against as for and by the professions,” it 
would be a mistake to say that their primary goal is self-beneficial rather than of benefit to 
the public); Gilb, supra note 115, at 62 (discussing the dual goals of public and private 
protection); Abel, supra note 113, at 38. 
123 See Akers, supra note 122, at 467-71 (noting that a “close relationship between the 
statutorily created boards and the private professional associations” facilitates, and 
sometimes finances, the activities of medical boards); Gilb, supra note 115, at 63 
(describing the development of state boards of bar examiners as a means of relieving state 
courts of the burden of handling bar admission). 
124 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
125 This justification is most clearly explicated in Mark Hall’s work on law, trust, and 
medical profession, which is discussed in greater detail in Section V.  See generally, Hall, 
supra note 120; Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is 
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B.  Justifications for Overriding Professional Self-Regulation 
 
Regardless of which justification for state delegation of authority to 
the professions is most compelling, a state that overrides professional self-
regulation should, as a matter of policy, have good reasons for doing so if 
its actions are to win public approval.126  There are three legitimate reasons 
for a legislature to override or reclaim powers that were previously 
delegated to a profession.  These reasons are conceptually consistent with 
general understandings of the rule of law, as well as the more specific 
justifications for state delegation of professional authority.127 
First, a state may legitimately reclaim regulatory authority if a 
self-regulating profession has overstepped the authority granted to it by the 
state and is acting beyond the scope of its delegated powers.128  In the health 
care context, one example would be a state’s decision to grant its Health 
Care Cost Containment Board (“HCCCB”) statutory jurisdiction over 
hospitals and nursing homes.  If the HCCCB later adopts a rule pertaining 
to freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, such a rule would be deemed to 
exceed the board’s statutory authority.129  Generally, however, the 
determination of whether an agency has overstepped its statutory authority 
is left to the judiciary.130   
Second, a state may reclaim direct regulatory authority over a 
profession if doing so is necessary to achieve the goals for which the 
profession was initially established.  In the context of medicine, for 
                                                                                                                            
It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 614 (2002). 
126 I emphasize that there is likely no legal impediment to such a reclamation of 
previously delegated powers, only that there are good policy reasons for legislatures to 
exercise restraint in taking such action.  See, e.g., Missouri Coalition for the Env’t v. Joint 
Commission on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 134 (Mo. 1997) (holding that, while a 
legislature “may not unilaterally control execution of rulemaking authority” after 
delegating such authority to an administrative agency, it may “attempt to control the 
executive branch by passing amendatory or supplemental legislation”); In re Adoption of 
Regs. Governing the State Health Plan, 135 N.J. 24, 27-28 (1994) (upholding the state 
legislature’s adoption of a statutory amendment prohibiting the state Department of Health 
from adopting conflicting regulations). 
127 See Section V, infra, for a more thorough discussion of why unjustified legislative 
overrides of professional powers previously delegated pursuant to the state’s police powers 
are problematic as a policy matter. 
128 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001) (holding that an 
administrative agency’s action qualifies for Chevron deference when the action was 
promulgated in the exercise of authority specifically delegated to the agency by a 
legislature) 
129 Cataract Surgery Center v. Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d 1359 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  
130 Chevron v. National Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
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example, direct state regulation may be appropriate if it is a more effective 
means for securing the welfare of individual patients and the health of the 
public.  This can occur if, for example, the conditions necessary for 
achieving the state’s medical goals have changed, and the profession’s 
existing authority under these changed circumstances is no longer adequate.  
Consider a public health emergency during which there is a shortage of 
licensed medical personnel; a state might reasonably suspend licensing 
requirements for out-of-state medical providers if doing so were deemed 
necessary to secure medical care for its population.131 
Finally, a state may reclaim professional authority when doing so is 
necessary to achieve other compelling public interests unrelated to its 
interests in medical care, provided that adequate safeguards are in place to 
protect patient welfare and public health.  Occasionally, the state’s action 
itself, though aimed at non-medical goals, may have a secondary effect of 
supporting the state’s medical goals.  Consider, for example, the Federal 
Trade Commission’s ("FTC") 1979 antitrust ruling against the AMA, which 
prohibited medical associations and state medical boards from enforcing 
their ethical guidelines regarding advertisement and price fixing.132  In that 
case, the FTC interfered with medical boards’ autonomy in an effort to 
prohibit anticompetitive behavior.  Although the FTC’s primary motives 
were economic in nature (rather than aimed at improving public health), 
they were sufficiently important to warrant intrusion in the professional 
sphere.  Moreover, the FTC’s intervention did not harm patients seeking 
medical care; arguably, it had a secondary effect of protecting patient 
welfare and public health.  In fact, in finding that the AMA’s prohibition on 
advertising constituted an unfair and anti-competitive practice, the FTC 
recognized the policy’s deleterious effects on public health, noting that 
restrictions on advertising have “a disproportionate effect on the poor, the 
sick, and the aged,” and that ensuring the availability of information about 
treatment costs “could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the 
enjoyment of basic necessities.”133 
If a state can point to one of these three justifications for 
intervention in the medical sphere, it will be on firm theoretical footing in 
                                                 
131 See, for example, § 507(a)(2) of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 
which authorizes the waiver of all state licensing requirements in the event of a public 
health emergency as necessary for health care providers licensed in other jurisdictions to 
practice in the state. This provision has been adopted as, among others, S.C. Code Ann. § 
44-4-570(b)(2) (2007); 20 DEL. C. § 3140(2)(b) (2008); N.J. STAT. § 26:13-18(b)(2) 
(2008); and 63 OKL. ST. § 6602(2)(b)  (2008). 
132 Matter of the Am. Med. Ass’n., 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979).   
133 Id.  See also Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding 
district court’s finding that the AMA violated federal antitrust laws by conspiring to 
eliminate the chiropractic profession). 
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choosing to reclaim regulatory authority that has been historically delegated 
to the profession.  Even if the state’s goals in adopting such a policy are 
unrelated to its traditional interests in professional regulation, the policy 
should nevertheless be evaluated with these factors in mind. 
 
IV. EVALUATING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SAFE HARBOR POLICIES 
 
For disciplinary safe harbors in the context of capital punishment to 
be defensible as a matter of public policy, proponents should be able to 
justify them on at least one of the three grounds set forth in Section III-B.  
This Section demonstrates that even the most compelling arguments in 
support of safe harbor policies do not demonstrate that they are necessary to 
prevent board action beyond the scope of delegated powers, to serve the 
state’s interests in public health and patient welfare, or to serve important 
state interests beyond the realm of medicine.  Moreover, even narrowly 
drafted safe harbor policies that emphasize the importance of patient 
welfare and tie disciplinary immunity to good faith physician participation 
requirements could not be justified on the grounds set forth herein. 
 
A.  Reinforcing the Scope of Authority Delegated to the Profession 
 
Capital punishment safe harbors cannot be justified by arguments 
that they are necessary to prevent the medical profession from overstepping 
the disciplinary authority delegated to it by the state.  First, the profession 
has always had the power to sanction medical providers for unprofessional 
and unethical conduct.  Furthermore, even if board discipline of execution 
participants were beyond the scope of the profession’s self-regulatory 
authority, in the thirty years that providers have been participating in lethal 
injections in contravention of the AMA’s ethical norms, not a single state 
medical board has ever initiated disciplinary action on these grounds.  
Regardless of the reasons for the unwillingness of medical boards to 
discipline execution participants, safe harbors policies are not necessary to 
correct or reinforce the scope of disciplinary authority delegated to the 
profession.  
The disciplinary powers granted to state medical licensing boards 
have long been broader than necessary to ensure that medical providers are 
technically competent to provide clinical care.  Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, boards have been authorized to take disciplinary action 
against physicians who engage in unprofessional or unethical conduct 
broadly defined.134  Some medical practice acts specifically enumerate those 
                                                 
134 Furrow, supra note 55, at 82-83.  See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 194 
(1898) (holding that character is as important a qualification for professional practice as 
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activities that constitute unprofessional conduct, while others rely on 
unprofessional conduct as a “catch-all when a board is convinced that 
disciplinary action should be taken but that the crime does not fit neatly into 
another category.”135  Whether or not specifically identified under the rubric 
of “unprofessional conduct,” statutes permit and courts regularly uphold 
professional discipline for a variety of behaviors that do not directly 
implicate clinical competence or patient safety – including being convicted 
of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude,136 failing to comply with a child 
support order,137 providing expert opinion to a court without reasonable 
investigation,138 ordering unnecessary laboratory tests,139 engaging in 
conduct that brings the medical profession into disrepute,140 or violating a 
professional code of ethics.141 
However, even if professional discipline for participation in capital 
punishment were deemed to be beyond the scope of medical boards’ 
authority,142 it is important to recognize that, in the nearly thirty years that 
                                                                                                                            
technical knowledge, and that a legislature that imposes educational requirements for 
medical licensure "may with equal propriety prescribe what evidence of good character 
shall be furnished.").  Some critics argue that medical professionals have no greater moral 
authority than laypersons or legislators and ought not be responsible for determining what 
constitutes unprofessional or unethical conduct subject to discipline, particularly if such 
determinations are made based on the profession’s stance on social policy.  See, e.g., 
Veatch, in Baker, supra note 121, at 165-66 (challenging the notion that “only those in a 
role can have knowledge of the [ethical] duties that attach to that role”); Stephen R. 
Latham, Linda L. Emanuel, "Who Needs Physicians' Professional Ethics?," in Baker, supra 
note 121, at 193-94.  A full defense of the existing system of professional licensure, which 
clearly authorizes sanctions for unprofessional conduct that does not implicate clinical 
competence, is far beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it to say that as a matter of 
both history and current practice, the American system of medical discipline, in giving 
medical boards discretion to sanction unprofessional and unethical conduct, implicitly 
recognizes that professional boards are in a better position than legislatures to determine 
how and when to enforce the profession’s ethical norms.  For a more thorough discussion 
of this issue, see Nadia N. Sawicki, A Theory of Discipline for Professional Misconduct, U. 
of Penn. L. Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 08-36, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1204642. 
135 Robert Cushing Derbyshire, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 85-86 (1978).  See, e.g., Forman v. State Board of Health, 157 Ky. 123, 127 (Ky. 
1914) (interpreting a statute providing for sanction for “other grossly unprofessional or 
dishonorable conduct of a character likely to deceive or defraud the public.”) 
136 Derbyshire, supra note 135, at 85; Furrow, supra note 55, at 82-83. 
137 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 232 (2007). 
138 See, e.g., Deatherage v. Board. of Psychology, 134 Wash.2d 131 (Wash. 1997); 
Huhta v. State Bd. Of Med., 706 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Comm. 1998). 
139 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 12-36-117(bb) (2007). 
140 See, e.g., KY. REV, STAT. § 311.597(4). 
141 See, e.g., OHIO REV. STAT. § 4731.22(B)(18) (2008).  
142 This is the position that was taken (erroneously, I argue) by the North Carolina 
Superior Court in N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Board.  It held that the 
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medical providers have been participating in lethal injections contrary to the 
ethical directives of the AMA, not a single medical board has taken 
disciplinary action against a provider on this basis, and only one board has 
even suggested a willingness to investigate or discipline these providers.143  
Thus, to the extent that existing safe harbor policies were justified by 
reference to the threat of board discipline, that threat appears to have been 
vague, at best.144   
Were boards to dramatically increase their rate of discipline against 
execution participants, states might be more justified in enacting safe harbor 
policies.  There is, however, no indication that this is likely to occur.  For a 
variety of reasons, state medical boards have historically been extremely 
cautious in exercising their disciplinary discretion.145  Though occasionally 
                                                                                                                            
medical board, in promulgating its position statement, “improperly exceeded the authority 
bestowed upon it to regulate the practice of medicine,” despite the fact that its policy 
specifically exempted from discipline those physicians who are merely present at an 
execution in compliance with the statutory requirements for lethal injection, and the fact 
that North Carolina’s medical practice act authorizes discipline for “unprofessional 
conduct,” including a “departure from … the ethics of the medical profession.”  See 
generally, supra notes 107-110. 
143 See generally, Section II-C.   
144 Admittedly in the early 1990’s, when the first safe harbors were adopted, the 
prospect of board discipline loomed large and legislators were unsure how great the risk 
might actually be.  However, by the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, it was abundantly clear 
that the threat of successful disciplinary action against participating physicians had not 
materialized, and that legislative action would not be necessary to prevent an imminent 
crisis.  Moreover, by the mid-1990’s, there was ample precedent from analogous 
pharmaceutical regulation cases that courts would be unwilling to recognize claims 
challenging an agency’s discretion not to investigate the improper use of prescription drugs 
in capital punishment proceedings. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. McKaskle, 729 F.2d 991, 993 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (rejecting as “insubstantial” and “unlikely to succeed” petitioner’s claim that 
defendants violated the FDCA by using drugs for lethal injection without demonstrating 
their safety and effectiveness for this use”); Del. v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del. Super. 
1994) (holding that a Delaware statute allowing correctional officers to obtain and use 
controlled substances without a prescription is not preempted by federal drug laws because 
it is not an obstacle to the execution of Congress’ goals); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen et al, 
2004 WL 2246227, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d 181 S.W. 
3d 292 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that state lethal injection protocols are exempt from drug and 
pharmacy acts). In fact, as early as 1985, the Supreme Court held, in Heckler v. Chaney, 
that the FDA’s decision not to take enforcement action against persons using prescription 
drugs for purposes of lethal injection was presumptively unreviewable under the 
Administrative Procedures Act. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
145 Until the mid- to late-20th century, medical boards were reluctant to initiate 
disciplinary actions against all but the most egregious violators of medical standards. 
Ameringer, supra note 119, at 2.  It was only in the 1970’s and 1980’s that, facing 
increased criticism of their passive stance on professional misconduct, boards became more 
active in disciplining medical providers, increasing eightfold the number of actions against 
physicians.  Jost, supra note 120, at 21-22; Ameringer, supra note 119, at 5.  Overall, 
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explained by reference to medical boards’ alleged impotence,146 a more 
compelling interpretation construes their caution as a matter of prudence 
and discretion.147  Because boards lack the resources to take disciplinary 
action against every provider who is alleged to have breached professional 
standards,148 they necessarily maintain a system of triage and ultimately 
pursue only the most fruitful claims.149  Moreover, in tracking a complaint 
through the disciplinary process, boards take into account a variety of 
countervailing practical and policy concerns, including the cost of 
prosecution, the potential effect of a disciplinary action on patient access, 
the political and professional implications of a disciplinary action, due 
process implications, and, most importantly, professional disagreements as 
to ethical practice and standards of care.150  Thus, the fact that medical 
boards exercise their disciplinary authority relatively infrequently does not 
necessarily suggest that they are negligent or unwilling to take action but 
rather reflects a prudent determination of which cases are worthy of action 
when competing values are at stake.151 
In the case of capital punishment, the reluctance of many boards to 
discipline participating physicians likely stems from the balancing of factors 
described above.  One of the most relevant considerations may be the fact 
that, despite the AMA’s formal imprimatur against physician participation, 
                                                                                                                            
however, the nationwide rate of board discipline continues to be low. Ameringer, supra 
note 119, at vi, 2; but see Jost, supra note 120, at 25 (noting that medical boards are no 
worse than other professional licensing boards in addressing disciplinary problems). 
146 See Jost, supra note 120, at 22 (“The licensure boards are often criticized as 
bungling and inept, or, worse, as corrupted by a desire to protect peer professionals from 
discipline and from public exposure.”). 
147 Consider an analogy – the relevance of the Supreme Court’s decisions to the 
American judicial system is not undermined by the fact that the Court ultimately resolves 
only a miniscule percentage of legal wrongs.  Numerous factors affect whether a claim is 
brought before the legal system in the first place and brought to a substantive resolution in 
the second, but these do not impact the Courts’ authority to resolve legal challenges and set 
important precedent. 
148 One reason why rates of board discipline are low is the systemic problem of 
underfunding.  Due to their limited budgets, state medical boards are faced with 
impediments including inadequate staffing, poor information technology services, and 
problems obtaining necessary expertise and evidence.  See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Pablo 
Aliaga & Josephine Gittler, STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL 
BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES, 9-10 (2006) [hereinafter, State Discipline of 
Physicians]; Jost, supra note 120, at 24. 
149 Because patients and their families are the primary sources of disciplinary 
complaints, boards see an extremely high volume of cases, many of which are 
nonactionable.  State Discipline of Physicians, supra note 148 at 21. 
150 Id. at 38-46.   
151 While this may be a rational approach in light of the practical necessity of triage, 
this Article does not address the broader question of what kinds of discipline medical 
boards should pursue if they had fewer financial constraints.  
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there is genuine dissent among the members of the medical profession as to 
whether individual physicians should participate in executions and, if they 
do, whether they should be disciplined.152  Thus, although the AMA deems 
participation in executions a violation of medical ethics, individual 
physicians have made good faith arguments in support of participation that 
are grounded in traditional principles of medical ethics – for example, that 
beneficence towards the prisoner-patient requires ensuring a humane 
death.153  Given that reasonable interpretations of professional norms have 
led to legitimate disagreement within the profession, it is very unlikely that 
boards charged with the legal enforcement of ethical norms would, absent 
other grounds, be willing to adopt a policy of disciplining execution 
participants.  Unless and until such a change occurs (an unlikely possibility, 
given medical boards’ disinclination to act on this issue thus far), safe 
harbors appear to be an unduly restrictive mechanism for protecting against 
the vaguest of threats. 
 
B.  Serving the Traditional Goals of Medical Regulation 
 
A more compelling justification of capital punishment safe harbor 
policies might be the argument that they are consistent with and necessary 
to achieve one of the traditional goals of medical regulation – namely, the 
promotion of patient welfare, defined narrowly in this case as the welfare of 
the condemned prisoner during the process of lethal injection.  If prisoner 
suffering can be minimized by having a physician present to ensure that the 
drugs are correctly administered and the prisoner is adequately anesthetized, 
then safe harbors policies might be justified as a means to this end.  
However, this position, while compelling in theory, has never been 
advanced by legislative proponents of safe harbor statutes, who instead 
emphasize the state’s interests in criminal punishment.  Moreover, even if 
legislators were to ground safe harbor policies in traditional medical goals, 
they would have difficulty justifying this position to the extent it is 
inconsistent with prevailing legal and professional norms.   
Some scholarly proponents of physician participation in capital 
punishment have argued that it is consistent with both state and professional 
interests in patient protection because it helps to ensure that the prisoner 
experiences a painless death.  Moreover, a vocal minority of physicians has 
taken the position that medical ethics may in fact obligate physicians to 
                                                 
152 Compare supra notes 61-67 and infra note 154.  See also, Commentaries and 
Letters to the Editor, 83 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113-123 (Jan. 2008) (reactions from the 
medical community to Waisel’s commentary promoting physician involvement in 
executions). 
153 See infra note 154. 
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intervene in the execution process to render it more humane; these 
practitioners generally compare the death row inmate to the terminally ill 
patient for whom physician beneficence offers the best hope of a “good 
death.”154  However, the legislative history of the safe harbor provisions 
reveals that no legislative proponent of safe harbor provisions has taken this 
position.155  The widely acknowledged legislative justification for safe 
harbors in the context of capital punishment is the pragmatic one of 
facilitating the implementation of lethal injection, rather than clarifying any 
theoretical concerns about the goals of medical practice.156  While issues of 
patient welfare may be at the heart of some of the unspoken constitutional 
concerns, nothing in the legislative history indicates that safe harbor 
policies are being implemented because they are consistent with the 
traditional goals of medical regulation.157  Granted, a state seeking to adopt 
a safe harbor policy could strengthen its position by making legislative 
findings about the link between medical participation in lethal injections 
and prisoner welfare, positioning the safe harbor as nothing more than a 
traditional regulation of medical practice.  This, however, would raise larger 
issues about how states ought to determine what constitutes patient welfare 
and how the goals of medicine are best achieved.   
A state that adopts a safe harbor policy with the express goal of 
promoting condemned prisoners’ medical welfare would have to confront 
head-on the conflict between its own interpretation of medical welfare and 
the interpretation offered by the AMA and the medical community (which, 
with few exceptions, considers the administration of lethal injection a harm 
to the prisoner-patient’s medical interests).158  Particularly in light of how 
deferential American law has traditionally been to the opinions of the 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Kenneth Baum, To Comfort Always: Physician Participation in 
Executions, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 47 (2002) (supporting physician participation 
in capital punishment; suggesting that legislation explicitly sanction participation); David 
Waisel, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1073, 
1073, 1079-80 (2007) (arguing that medicine has an obligation to permit participation in 
executions to minimize harm to the condemned).  In fact, 41% of respondents in a recent 
survey of practicing physicians reported a willingness, at least in theory, to participate in a 
lethal injection by performing at least one action considered impermissible by the AMA.  
Neil H. Farber et al., Physicians’ Willingness to Participate in the Process of Lethal 
Injection for Capital Punishment, 135(10) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 884, at 887 (2001) 
[hereinafter, Farber 2001].   
155 See generally, Section II-C. 
156 See, e.g., supra notes 81, 85-89, 92, 96-98, 100-104, 101 and accompanying text. 
157 Indeed, the fact that most safe harbor and exclusionary provisions are located in 
state criminal procedure statutes, rather than medical practice acts, further supports this 
conclusion. 
158 See generally, supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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medical profession in technical matters as well as matters of discipline,159 
the state must make a strong argument for why its interpretation of patient 
welfare should prevail.160  One way in which the state could seek to 
discredit the medical profession’s conception of patient welfare is by 
suggesting that the profession’s opinion on this issue is driven more by 
political opposition to capital punishment than true concern about what is 
best for patients.  In other words, while a state may be willing to defer to 
medical opinions in matters relating to medical practice, it will not do so in 
matters of public policy where the medical profession’s stance is based on 
ideology rather than public welfare. 
While the political leanings of the medical profession may have 
some impact on AMA policy,161 their relevance seems limited in the case of 
capital punishment safe harbors.  In this context and others, the AMA has 
taken a clear and consistent position opposing medical facilitation of death, 
even if done for humanitarian purposes.  Consider, for example, the AMA’s 
policy on physician assisted suicide, which, while recognizing that some 
terminally ill patients may prefer death over life, nevertheless holds that 
physician-assisted suicide “would cause more harm than good” because it is 
“fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.”162  In 
contrast, any state that seeks to make a patient welfare argument in support 
of safe harbors for execution participants would have to reconcile its 
position on this issue with the precedent set in Washington v. Glucksberg 
and Vacco v. Quill, in which the Supreme Court rejected patient welfare-
based arguments in support of physician assisted suicide.163  Moreover, in 
                                                 
159 See generally, Section III, supra.  Consider also the numerous precedents where, 
rather than allowing legislatures to reach their own conclusions about what patient welfare 
requires, courts have deferred to the determinations of individual medical providers and the 
judgment of the medical profession as a whole.  See, for example, Washington v. Harper, 
Riggins v. Nevada, and Sell v. Unites States, which reinforce the principle that the 
involuntary medical treatment of prisoners is constitutionally permissible only if deemed 
medically appropriate by the treating physician, regardless of what prison policy requires. 
While recognizing “the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis,” the Supreme Court 
refused to accept the notion that “the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by 
shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science 
to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer[.]” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 232 (1990) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, at 607-609).  Similarly, in Roe v. 
Wade, the Supreme Court identified the first-trimester abortion decision as “inherently, and 
primarily, a medical decision,” the basic responsibility for which “must rest with the 
physician,” rather than the legislature. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-166 (1973).  
160 See generally, Lerman, supra note 7, at 1973-77 (proposing a model of judicial 
deference to medical ethics).   
161 But see, supra note 63. 
162 American Medical Association Opinion 2.211, Physician-Assisted Suicide (issued 
June 1994, updated June 1996). 
163 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
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these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that one of the traditional 
purposes of medical regulation, beyond promoting patient welfare and 
public health, is safeguarding the “ethics and integrity of the medical 
profession.”164  The Court objected to physician assisted suicide in part 
because it could “undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient 
relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and 
harming.”165  Given that the Supreme Court has cited the states’ interests in 
preserving public trust in the medical profession as a reason for rejecting a 
right to physician assisted suicide, the adoption of safe harbor policies in the 
context of capital punishment without reference to this principle seems ill-
advised. 
If a state were truly interested in serving the traditional goals of 
medical regulation, then it would focus not only on basic notions of 
patients’ welfare as understood by the medical profession, but also on 
preserving the “trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship.”  It is 
not clear that safe harbor policies adequately serve either of these two 
goals.166 
 
C.  Serving State Interests Unrelated to Medical Regulation 
 
If one can draw any general conclusion about the legislative 
justifications for safe harbor provisions from the history set forth in Section 
II, it is that they were adopted in response to concerns that state executions 
might be delayed or even halted altogether if medical professionals were 
unwilling to participate.  In their extremely limited public discussions of the 
                                                                                                                            
(1997).  If anything, patient welfare  arguments would be stronger in the case of physician 
assisted suicide, which involves a competent and consenting patient’s right to end his own 
life, as opposed to physician assistance in capital punishment, which involves patients who 
are involuntarily imprisoned and have not consented to treatment or execution.  
164 See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007) (citing Washington, 521 
U.S. 702); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 352 (1985)  (recognizing the state’s interest in 
“safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession” as a countervailing interest to a 
competent patient’s right to refuse medical treatment); Barsky v. Board of Regents of Univ. 
of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (noting the state’s "legitimate concern for maintaining 
high standards of professional conduct" in the practice of medicine); Haley v. Med. Discip. 
Bd., 117 Wash. 2d 720, 732 (1991) (describing one of the purposes of medical discipline as 
protecting the medical profession’s standing in the public eye). 
165 Washington, 521 U.S. at 731. 
166 Note that the arguments in this Section regarding how states should define their 
medical interests could also be used to oppose medical involvement in executions 
generally.  I do not intend to blur the distinction between physician participation 
requirements and safe harbor policies, but merely to point out the inconsistencies that 
might arise were states to justify safe harbors on patient welfare grounds.  See also note 
193, infra. 
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merits of the disciplinary safe harbors, legislators expressed hope that the 
policies would prevent delays in scheduled executions that might otherwise 
result from challenges by physicians opposing medical participation, 
constitutional challenges by prisoners, and practical delays resulting from 
an inability on the part of prison wardens to find adequate personnel to 
assist in executions.167  Ultimately, then, the purpose of the safe harbor 
policies was to ensure that capital punishment, deemed by most states to be 
a necessary and important feature of the American criminal justice system, 
could proceed without impediment.168 
For a medical regulation to be justified on grounds unrelated to the 
states' traditional medical interests, at least two conditions must be satisfied.  
First, the state should demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to 
achieve the non-medical interest in question (in this case, effective 
implementation of capital punishment).  Second, the state should either 
ensure that alternate safeguards are in place to protect medical interests, or 
demonstrate that its non-medical interests are so compelling as to warrant 
intervention without providing additional protections for patient welfare and 
public health.  Arguments for disciplinary safe harbors for lethal injection 
participants satisfy neither of these conditions. 
 
1. Demonstrating Necessity and Efficacy 
 
Proponents of disciplinary safe harbors cannot justify them on the 
grounds that they are necessary to support the states' compelling interest in 
criminal punishment.  Safe harbor policies are neither required as a matter 
of statutory nor constitutional law, and there is no evidence to suggest that 
they are likely to have a significant impact on states’ ability to conduct 
lawful executions. 
 
a. Statutory Necessity 
 
The most straightforward argument that can be made in support of 
safe harbor policies is that they are necessary and logical corollaries to state 
criminal procedure statutes requiring medical participation in executions.169  
If a state legislature has determined that legal executions cannot proceed 
without the presence of a physician or other licensed provider, then 
permitting a state medical board to discipline providers for doing what is 
                                                 
167 See generally, Section II-C, supra.  
168 This, of course, serves the states' interests in criminal punishment generally, 
including deterrence, public safety, and retribution.  
169 See, e.g., Baum, supra note 154, at 72-75 (noting that statutes requiring medical 
involvement take precedence over medical practice acts that merely permit discipline).  
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required of them by law would directly frustrate the legislature’s intent.   
While this argument could be used to defend narrow safe harbors in 
states with explicit medical participation requirements, it is of limited 
practical value in defending existing safe harbors.  Few, if any, of the safe 
harbor policies currently in force are narrowly tailored to protect only those 
physicians whose involvement in executions is specifically required by state 
law.  Of the thirty-seven jurisdictions that authorize the use of lethal 
injection as an execution method, physician attendance is statutorily 
required in sixteen.170  Of those sixteen state statutes, none explicitly 
requires or contemplates that the physician take any specific action beyond 
being present as a witness, declaring death, or certifying that the execution 
has taken place,171 arguably among the least controversial forms of medical 
participation otherwise prohibited by the AMA.  In some states, Department 
of Corrections regulations may impose more specific participation 
requirements for physicians or other medical providers, but the secrecy 
surrounding these regulations make it impossible to determine how often 
this may be the case.172 
Indeed, medical providers who admit to having participated in 
executions typically acknowledge that when their actions have gone beyond 
the boundaries of what is considered acceptable by the AMA, it is not as a 
result of any explicit legal requirement. Instead, the role just “crept up on 
them.”173  If we accept the fact that many (if not most) cases of medical 
involvement in executions involve activities that are not explicitly required 
by state law, then we must also recognize that many (if not most) cases 
could conceivably be subject to medical board discipline without frustrating 
legislative intent.  Because there is no inherent contradiction if a state 
medical board takes disciplinary action against a physician for doing 
something that is neither legally required nor prohibited, existing safe 
harbors are unnecessary to facilitate the legislative goals set forth in lethal 
injection statutes. 
Consider, for example, the legislative mandate in Ohio, where the 
criminal procedure statute permitting medical involvement in executions is 
                                                 
170 See Levy, supra note 43, at 265 (citing, prior to New Jersey’s 2007 repeal of the 
death penalty, seventeen states). 
171 Id. at 265; but see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-2 (2006) (repealed Dec. 17, 2007) 
(providing that, prior to lethal injection, the inmate “shall be sedated by a licensed 
physician, registered nurse, or other qualified personnel”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-8 
(2006) (repealed Dec. 17, 2007) (providing that the physician present at the execution shall 
examine the body and make a written report as to the same). 
172 See supra note 46.  Moreover, unlike statutory participation requirements, 
Department of Corrections regulations take no precedence over regulations or adjudications 
by state medical licensing boards.     
173 Gawande, supra note 71, at 1223.  
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much less explicit than the medical practice act authorizing board 
discipline.  Ohio’s medical practice act requires that the state medical board 
“keep on file current copies of the codes of ethics of the various national 
professional organizations” and provides that the board “shall” discipline or 
limit the right to practice of a medical provider for “violation of any 
provision of a code of ethics of the American [M]edical [A]ssociation … or 
any other national professional organizations that the board specifies by 
rule.”174  In contrast, Ohio’s criminal procedure statute specifies, with 
respect to involvement in executions, only that a prison physician “may” be 
present.175  Were the Ohio medical board to sanction a physician for 
participating in an execution, a court reviewing the board’s decision could 
reasonably conclude that the board’s authority to discipline physicians for 
ethical violations has been more clearly established by the legislature than 
any authority the department of corrections might have to require physician 
participation.  
 Turning to the nine safe harbors that have been created in recent 
years, only one is drafted as a narrow corollary to the state’s lethal injection 
statute. Virginia law requires that a Department of Corrections physician be 
present at an execution by lethal injection, and that he “perform an 
examination to determine that death has occurred.”176  By way of a 1994 
Attorney General opinion, Virginia established a limited safe harbor for 
physicians who comply with these specific statutory requirements.  
Responding to an inquiry by the Director of the Department of Corrections, 
the Attorney General acknowledged in a carefully-worded opinion that “it 
would be an obvious absurdity” to permit medical board discipline of a 
physician who complies with the statutory requirements.177  “Whatever 
discretion the Board may otherwise have in the context of a disciplinary 
proceeding to adopt the ethical standards of the AMA or any other 
professional group,” the Attorney General wrote, “it has no such discretion 
when applicable state statutes require that a physician perform the acts in 
question.”178  The opinion did not, however, extend this safe harbor to 
physicians engaged in execution-related activities not expressly required by 
statute. 
Of the remaining eight states with safe harbor policies, four – 
                                                 
174 OHIO REV. STAT. 4731.22(B)(18) (2008).  
175 OHIO REV. STAT. 2949.25(A)(4) (2008). 
176 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234, 235 (2007).   
177 1994 VA. OP. ATTY. GEN. 85 (Apr. 26, 1994). 
178 Emphasis added. See 1994 VA. OP. ATTY. GEN. 85 (Apr. 26, 1994), providing,“[A] 
physician may not be disciplined by the Board for attending or observing an execution, for 
making a determination that death has occurred, for issuing a certificate of death, or for 
performing any other function that applicable state statutes lawfully require to be 
performed by a physician in connection with an execution.”  [Emphasis added] 
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Georgia,179 North Carolina,180 Oregon,181 and Oklahoma182 – have statutory 
participation requirements but protect physicians from discipline even if 
they engage in actions beyond those explicitly required by statute.  For 
example, North Carolina’s lethal injection statutes require that the prison 
physician or surgeon attend the execution and certify the fact of execution; 
they also require that “qualified personnel” administer the injections and 
perform other relevant tasks.183  In establishing a judicial safe harbor, 
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that these statutes 
indicate a legislative intent that a physician “be present to perform medical 
tasks for which he is uniquely qualified” and held that physicians 
participating in executions, “even if engaged in medical evaluations, 
examinations, assessments and procedures” beyond the scope of the 
statutory requirements, are not subject to review or discipline by the state 
medical board.184  In its brief to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the 
North Carolina Medical Board highlighted this inconsistency, arguing that 
the Superior Court’s conclusion that “the legislature clearly intended that a 
physician attend and provide professional medical assessment, assistance 
and oversight in every judicial execution” contradicts both the plain 
language of the lethal injection statutes and their legislative history.185 
The remaining four states – Arkansas,186 Arizona,187 Missouri,188 
                                                 
179 Georgia’s lethal injection statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-41, 38(d) (2007), 
requires the presence of “two physicians to determine when death supervenes.”  Its safe 
harbor, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-42.1 (2007), arguably goes beyond the express 
requirements of the lethal injection statute, providing that “[p]articipation in any execution 
of any convicted person  . . . shall not be the subject of any licensure challenge, suspension, 
or revocation.”   
180 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190, 188, 192 (2007). 
181 Oregon’s lethal injection statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (2005) provides that the 
prison superintendent “shall invite” the presence of a physician or nurse.  Its safe harbor, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 137.476 (2005), provides that a licensed medical professional “may 
assist” with the execution and that “any assistance rendered” will not be cause for 
discipline. 
182 Oklahoma’s lethal injection statute, 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1014, 1015 (2007), requires 
that the prison warden invite a physician to be present at an execution, and that a physician 
be the one to pronounce the prisoner’s death.  Its safe harbor statute, 59 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 4001 (2007), however, protects physicians from a much broader range of activities, 
providing that no disciplinary action will be taken by a medical board against a person “for 
the reason that the person participated in any manner in the execution of a judgment of 
death.” (emphasis added).   
183 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190, 188, 192 (2007). 
184 N.C. Dep’t of Corrections v. N.C. Med. Bd., Civ. No. 07- 003574 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
185 Brief of North Carolina Medical Board, at 22, N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. 
N.C. Med. Bd. , No. 51PA08 (N.C. 2008), filed July 26, 2008. 
186 Arkansas’ lethal injection statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617 (2008), requires that 
the prisoner’s death be pronounced “according to accepted standards of medical practice,” 
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and California189  – offer similarly broad safe harbors, even in the absence 
of statutory participation requirements. Consider, for example, Arizona, 
which does not require physician attendance190 but nevertheless provides 
disciplinary immunity for persons who perform “ancillary functions” at 
executions.191  Indeed, even the use of the word “ancillary” in the safe 
harbor statute suggests that licensed medical personnel are not, as a 
statutory matter, necessary participants in a lethal injection. 
Legislatures could, of course, modify existing safe harbor policies to 
protect execution participants from discipline only if they engage in conduct 
expressly required by law.  Such narrowly tailored safe harbors would be a 
step in the right direction but would still be subject to challenge on a variety 
of grounds, including lack of efficacy and inadequate protection of patient 
interests.192  Moreover, the underlying physician participation requirements 
might also be subject to challenges on similar grounds.193 
 
                                                                                                                            
but does not expressly require that a licensed medical provider be the one to do so.  Its safe 
harbor, Ark. Code Ann. § 17-80-108 (2008), protects licensed personnel from discipline for 
“[a]ny assistance rendered with any execution.” 
187 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-704, 705 (2007). 
188 Missouri’s lethal injection statute does not require physician involvement, but 
provides that the execution team shall include, among others, “those persons, such as 
medical personnel, who provide direct support for the administration of … lethal 
chemicals.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720(2) (2007).  Its safe harbor is broader, however, 
protecting execution team members from discipline by a “licensing board or department” 
as a result of their “participation in a lawful execution.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720(4) 
(2007).   
189 At the time that the California Court of Appeal decided in Thorburn that the 
legislature did not intend to include physician participation in capital punishment within the 
ambit of “unprofessional conduct” prohibited by the Business and Professional Code, 
California’s lethal injection statute, CAL. PEN. CODE § 3605 (1998) required the warden to 
“invite the presence of two physicians” to executions.  However, given that the lethal 
injection statute was amended in 2001 to eliminate reference to physicians, instead 
providing that “no physician or any other person … shall be compelled to attend the 
execution,” CAL. PEN. CODE § 3605(c) (2007), it is an open question as to whether 
Thorburn’s broad common law safe harbor is still in force.   
190 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-704, 705 (2007). 
191 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-704(D) (2007). 
192 See Sections IV-C-1-c and IV-C-2. 
193 While this Article does not challenge the legitimacy of physician participation 
requirements generally, a number of the arguments expressed herein could also be used to 
oppose participation requirements, which may have similar effects on public trust in the 
medical profession.  See, for example, Sections IV-B (regarding professional support of 
state definitions of patient welfare), IV-C-1-b (regarding constitutional necessity), and 
IV-C-2 (regarding inadequacy of patient protections). 
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b. Constitutional Necessity 
 
A more compelling justification for safe harbor statutes, though one 
that was left conspicuously unspoken by legislators, is that they are 
necessary for the constitutional implementation of capital punishment.  
Legislators might have seen the adoption of safe harbors as necessary to 
preempt the possibility, no matter how remote, that the American execution 
process might grind to a halt as a result of medical opposition. This 
justification assumes that medical participation is required as a 
constitutional matter.  As has been widely recognized by physicians and 
courts alike, the three-drug cocktail currently used for lethal injection 
involves a risk that a prisoner will suffer cruel and unusual punishment 
during the execution process if he is inadequately anesthetized and prison 
personnel proceed with the execution nevertheless.194  No court, however, 
has yet held that the Eighth Amendment requires physician participation in 
lethal injection as a matter of course.195  Indeed, as demonstrated in this 
Section, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baze v. Rees only weakens 
the argument from constitutional necessity. 
In Baze v. Rees, two death row prisoners brought an Eight 
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol.196  While 
conceding that the protocol would be humane if properly administered, the 
petitioners alleged that the risk of improper administration was 
unnecessarily high because the lethal injection personnel are not qualified to 
mix the correct dose of anesthetic, establish intravenous (“IV”) access, 
identify IV problems, or monitor anesthetic depth.197  The Kentucky 
protocol requires that IV team members “have at least one year of 
professional experience as a certified medical assistant, phlebotomist, EMT, 
paramedic, or military corpsman” but prohibits physician participation 
except as necessary to certify the cause of death or to “revive the prisoner in 
the event of last-minute stay of execution.”198 
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ challenge, holding that 
a successful Eighth Amendment claim must establish that the state’s lethal 
injection protocol “creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain,” and that this 
risk is “substantial when compared to the known and available 
alternatives.”199  In other words, even if Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol 
did create a risk of severe pain, it would not be struck down unless the 
                                                 
194 See supra notes 3 and 39. 
195 But see supra notes 99 and 102. 
196 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. __ (2008) (slip op., at 1-2). 
197 Id. (slip op., at 10, 15-17, 20-21). 
198 Id. (slip op., at 6). 
199 Id. (slip op., at 22). 
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petitioners could identify an alternative protocol that would be substantially 
less dangerous.200  While leaving open the possibility that another state’s 
execution protocol might be successfully challenged if it satisfied these 
standards, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners in Baze had not 
demonstrated a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk that the 
Kentucky protocol would lead to improper administration of anesthetic.201  
With respect to dosage, the Court upheld the lower court’s finding that there 
is minimal risk of improperly mixing the anesthetic if the manufacturers’ 
instructions are followed (even by a layperson).202  The Court likewise 
noted that problems with IV insertion or infiltration were unlikely given the 
training requirements for IV team members and the presence of the warden, 
who could watch for signs of infiltration.203  Finally, with respect to 
monitoring anesthetic depth, the Court found that “a proper dose of 
thiopental obviates the concern that the prisoner will not be sufficiently 
sedated,” concluding that the risk posed by Kentucky’s failure to adopt 
additional monitoring procedures was “even more . . . attenuated” than the 
risk of improper administration of anesthetic.204   
Given that the only medical personnel involved in Kentucky’s 
execution procedure are a phlebotomist and an EMT,205 neither of whom 
are licensed by the state,206 and that their sole responsibility during the 
execution is insertion of an IV, after which they leave the execution 
chamber,207 the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze effectively preempted 
future arguments that the involvement of physicians or other licensed 
medical personnel in lethal injections is required as a matter of 
constitutional law.208   
                                                 
200 The petitioners suggested that a one-drug protocol using only a lethal dose of 
anesthetic was a “known and available alternative” posing substantially less risk than 
Kentucky’s three-drug protocol.  However, the Supreme Court rejected this claim on 
evidentiary grounds.  Id. (slip op., at 17-21). 
201 Id. (slip op., at 15). 
202 Id. (slip op., at 15). 
203 Id. (slip op., at 16-17).  
204 Id. (slip op., at 20-22). 
205 Id. (slip op., at 6, 16). 
206 Kentucky does not license EMTs, but they are required by the Kentucky Board of 
Emergency Medical Services to be certified pursuant to 202 Ky. Admin. Reg. 7:301 
(2007).  Kentucky does not license or certify phlebotomists; however, phlebotomists can be 
privately certified by the National Phlebotomy Association.  
http://www.nationalphlebotomy.org/.   
207 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. ___ (slip op., Ginsburg dissent at 6). 
208 A more striking blow to medical participation was delivered by Justice Alito, whose 
concurrence elaborated on the possibility of involving additional medical personnel.  While 
agreeing that the risk of unconstitutional pain would be minimized if medical professionals 
such as anesthesiologists participated in the execution process, Alito rejected this 
alternative by pointing to the fact that professional rules of ethics and traditions prohibit it. 
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Though implicitly calling into question the judicial orders in cases 
like Morales and Taylor, the reasoning in Baze is consistent with earlier 
scholarly arguments questioning the necessity of medical licensure for 
execution participants.  Even before the Supreme Court accepted certiorari 
in Baze v. Rees, many scholars argued that the benefits of medical 
participation in executions could be achieved through the use of unlicensed 
personnel with adequate training in lethal injection procedures.209  “An 
argument from technical expertise,” noted bioethicist Art Caplan, “simply 
requires that appropriate training be given by the state to a person who can 
then competently handle the job.  It is difficult to believe that the only 
persons capable of administering lethal injections are graduates of medical 
schools and residency programs.”210  In other words, if the presumption that 
prison personnel can substitute for licensed medical personnel in the context 
of capital punishment has “proven inaccurate time and time again,”211 this 
has resulted from a lack of training, not a lack of licensure.  Accordingly, 
commentators argued, concerns about the qualifications of lethal injection 
personnel might be adequately addressed simply by improving the training 
and oversight provided by state departments of corrections.212   
                                                                                                                            
Alito wrote, “[T]he ethics rules of medical professionals – for reasons that I certainly do 
not question here – prohibit their participation in executions.” From this, he concluded that 
“[o]bjections to features of a lethal injection protocol must be considered against the 
backdrop of the ethics rules of medical professionals and related practical constraints.” See 
generally, Id. (slip op., Alito concurrence at 2-5).  This language, while not binding, seems 
to accurately reflect the presumption made by many justices (and by the parties) during oral 
arguments that, as a result of the AMA’s ethical prohibition, medical personnel would 
simply be unwilling to participate in Kentucky lethal injections.  See Transcript, at 12-13, 
39, Baze v. Rees, U.S. Supreme Court No. 07-5439 (Jan. 7, 2008) [hereinafter, Baze 
Transcript]. Justice Scalia, for example, noted during oral arguments that “medical doctors, 
according to the Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association, can't participate” in 
lethal injections. Baze Transcript, at 6. 
209 See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Should Physicians Participate in Capital Punishment?, 
82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1047, 1048 (Sept. 2007); William L. Lanier, Physician 
Participation in Capital Punishment: Simplifying a Complex Calculus, 82 MAYO CLINIC 
PROC. 1043, 1045-46 (Sept. 2007). 
210 Caplan, supra note 209, at 1048. 
211 Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 91. 
212 A more controversial possibility would be to create a new category of professional 
under a state’s licensing statute – for example, a Licensed Practitioner of Execution 
(“LPE”).  Like other licensed professionals, LPEs would be required to complete a course 
of training and education before beginning their professional practice and would then be 
subject to regulation by a state agency independent of the state medical board.  In fact, the 
credentialing program required of LPEs might even be administered by the state 
Department of Corrections, their likely employer, much in the same way that early nursing 
diploma programs were administered within individual hospitals seeking to train nurses for 
their own patient populations.  For more on the topic of role morality and practice 
positivism, see Arthur Isak Applbaum, Doctor, Schmoctor: Practice Positivism and Its 
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Moreover, even if the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze had left 
greater leeway for constitutional objections to the administration of lethal 
injections by non-medical personnel, the defense of safe harbor policies 
would be far from complete. While the threatened abolition of capital 
punishment may be an effective rallying cry for safe harbor proponents, it is 
hardly a realistic threat. Historically, each rejection of execution technology 
has resulted not in an abandonment of the practice of capital punishment 
altogether but in an improvement in methodology to satisfy evolving 
constitutional norms.213  From improving training for lethal injection 
personnel to modifying the injection procedure so as to minimize the 
necessity of medical expertise, a constitutional method of lethal injection 
could likely exist even in the absence of medical involvement.  Although 
the Supreme Court in Baze ultimately rejected on evidentiary grounds the 
petitioners’ suggestion to replace the three-drug protocol with a single-drug 
protocol,214 it left open the possibility that alternative procedures might be 
considered in future cases if their feasibility and effectiveness were 
adequately documented.215  Modifications to lethal injection protocols that 
minimize or eliminate the need for licensed personnel would make it 
possible for states to proceed with executions even in the event of an 
absolute boycott by physicians and nurses. 
Finally, yet another solution might be to eliminate lethal injection 
entirely in favor of an alternative execution protocol.  Some scholars have 
suggested that execution by firing squad or at gunpoint poses no more than 
a minimal risk of violating the Eighth Amendment,216 and as recently as 
1994, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, refused to find hanging 
                                                                                                                            
Complications, in Baker, supra note 121, at 144-48 (accepting that, under a theory of 
practice positivism, physicians may use their expertise for a wide variety of purposes; 
labeling the use of medical skills in such contexts “schmoctoring,” to distinguish it from 
“doctoring”).  
Such a system, however, would likely face opposition by the medical profession, 
which has historically opposed the establishment of independent regulatory schemes for 
professionals such as midwives, chiropractors, and osteopaths. See generally, PAUL STARR, 
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 223 (1984).  Furthermore, to the 
extent that licensed medical personnel were involved in training LPEs, they might be 
subject to disciplinary action for indirect participation in the lethal injection process.  See 
Dworkin, supra note 8, at 187-88.  Moreover, because such a system of alternative 
licensing would still have the effect of limiting the scope of medical board authority 
without adequate justification, it would not adequately address the argument of declining 
professional trust set forth herein. 
213 See Section II-A. 
214 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. ___ (slip op., at 12). 
215 Id. (slip op., at 12).  
216 See, e.g., Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 63 (noting that execution by firing squad, 
though it “carrie[s] with it the baggage of its brutal image and roots,” may in fact be “the 
most humane of all methods.”). 
48 DOCTORS, DISCIPLINE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
unconstitutional.217  Furthermore, given the level of technical ingenuity 
exhibited in the past century, it is possible that other constitutional 
execution methods may yet be discovered.218   
 
c. Efficacy  
 
Even if physician participation were required as a statutory or 
constitutional matter, policymakers have failed to demonstrate that the 
adoption of disciplinary safe harbor policies would be an effective means of 
increasing medical participation in executions.  Because there is no 
evidence to suggest that the actual or perceived threat of disciplinary action 
is a significant factor driving physician behavior in this context, it is 
unlikely that elimination of board discipline would make medical providers 
significantly more likely to participate. 
First, as noted earlier, in the nearly thirty years that medical 
providers have been participating in lethal injections contrary to the ethical 
directives of the AMA, only one state medical board has ever independently 
taken any steps that suggests a willingness to investigate or discipline those 
providers.219  Every disciplinary challenge that was brought before the 
courts, whether in the medical or pharmaceutical contexts, was raised by 
individuals critical of the medical boards’ allegedly lax approaches to 
disciplining participants in capital punishment.  Given how infrequent and 
unsuccessful these disciplinary inquiries have been, it would be difficult for 
proponents of modern safe harbor policies to argue in good faith that 
medical providers’ behavior is likely to be chilled by threats of board 
discipline. 
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that states, including those 
that adopted or considered adopting safe harbor statutes, have had trouble 
finding willing medical providers to assist, as necessary, in lethal 
injections.220  In Pennsylvania, for example, where safe harbor legislation 
                                                 
217 Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The number of states using 
hanging is evidence of public perception, but sheds no light on the actual pain that may or 
may not attend the practice.”).  But see Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (J. 
Blackmun, dissent) (concluding that hanging is a practice offensive to civilized society and 
therefore unconstitutional). 
218 With few exceptions, however, the pursuit of alternate methods of capital 
punishment has not been explored.  See, e.g., Deborah Denno, Getting to Death: Are 
Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 318 (1997); Kristina E. Beard, Comment, 
Five Under the Eighth: Methodology Review and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445 (1997). 
219 See Section II-C and supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text. 
220  See, for example, Arkansas, which executed five prisoners in 1994 (the year before 
its safe harbor was adopted); Arizona, which executed four prisoners in 1998 (before the 
safe harbor’s Dec. 31, 1998 effective date); California, which executed one prisoner in 
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was being considered in 1994, officials had anticipated problems finding 
physicians to participate in scheduled executions, but later reported that 
several offered their services.221  Reports of licensed medical providers 
participating in executions abound, most notably in Atul Gawande’s 2006 
study, which reinforced the fact that physicians who choose to participate 
do so in reliance on their personal ethic of care and sense of civic duty, 
regardless of the potential disciplinary consequences.222  If threats of board 
discipline were as imminent as safe harbor proponents feared, one would 
expect to find far more dramatic shortages of execution personnel.223 
Finally, there is no evidence that medical providers who refuse to 
participate in executions generally do so as a result of consequentialist 
concerns about professional discipline; rather, their motivations appear to 
be deontological in nature.  Indeed, evidence of physicians’ attitudes about 
participation in capital punishment suggests that actual or perceived threats 
of board discipline are not a significant motivating factor in their behavior.  
Consider, for example, that only three percent of physicians surveyed in 
1999 were even aware that the AMA had any guidelines on physician 
participation in capital punishment, making it unlikely that their 
participation decisions were driven by the risk of medical board 
enforcement of this policy.224  Consider also that the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                            
1998 (before Thorburn); Georgia, which executed three prisoners in 2005 (the year before 
its safe harbor was adopted); and Oklahoma, which executed four prisoners in each of 2005 
and 2006 (before the safe harbor’s Nov. 1, 2006 effective date).  All data collected from the 
Death Penalty Information Center, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.  Note that the number of 
executions per year may not be an adequate metric for determining the extent of physician 
participation, as it does not take into account the number of participating physicians, their 
level of involvement, or other relevant factors (success of appeals, pardons, moratoria, 
national trends, etc.).  However, in the absence of any quantitative study, it may be a useful 
metric, because if medical participation were necessary for executions, a state unable to 
find willing medical providers would necessarily be unable to effectuate executions.  
221 Beth Wagner, Death by Lethal Injection Brings its Own Problems For Corrections 
Officials, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 17, 1994, at D2.  
222 Gawande, supra note 71.  See also Neil Farber et al., Physicians' Attitudes About 
Involvement in Lethal Injection for Capital Punishment, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 
2912, 2913-15 (Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter, Farber 2000] (finding that physician 
willingness to participate in lethal injection was associated with personal factors unrelated 
to professional discipline – including support for the death penalty, belief in the 
effectiveness of the death penalty in reducing the murder rate, support for assisted suicide, 
and a belief that physicians have a “duty to society” to participate in executions). 
223 There is, however, some evidence that the threat of discipline may have increased 
the costs of executions.  See Michael Mears, Lethal Injection and the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s New Millennium, CHAMPION (Jan/Feb 2004) (noting that, after Zitrin, the cost per 
execution in Georgia rose from $850 to $18,000).   
224 Neil H. Farber et al, Physicians’ Willingness to Participate in the Process of Lethal 
Injection for Capital Punishment, 135(10) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 884, at 886-7 
(2001) [hereinafter, Farber 2001].  In fact, those physicians who were members of the 
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professional opposition to physician participation in capital punishment, as 
reflected in the medical literature, is grounded in normative understandings 
of personal or professional ethics, rather than any threat of disciplinary 
consequences.225 
In fact, there have been only two cases in which medical providers’ 
unwillingness to participate has actually halted the progress of executions.  
In both cases, the specific circumstances of each case suggest that the threat 
of board discipline was not a significant factor.  Though neither California 
nor Missouri law require that physicians attend or participate in 
executions,226 district court judges in both states recently resolved two 
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment challenges by ordering that a board-certified 
anesthesiologist attend and supervise the prisoners’ executions.227  When 
qualified anesthesiologists could not be found, executions in both states 
were stayed.228   
In California, two anesthesiologists initially volunteered their 
services; they later changed their minds only after they were told they 
would have to intervene in the execution if there were any problems.  While 
active intervention in an execution is arguably a greater reason for 
discipline than mere attendance and oversight, both are prohibited under the 
AMA’s policy. The fact that the anesthesiologists volunteered in the first 
place, in itself a violation of medical ethics, suggests that the threat of board 
discipline was not a significant motivating factor in their decisions.229   
Though there were no volunteers in Missouri,230 there is evidence 
that the lack of executioner confidentiality was perceived to be a much more 
important factor in the anesthesiologists’ refusals than the prospect of 
                                                                                                                            
AMA were more likely to report a willingness to participate.  Id.   
225 See supra note 63. 
226 Missouri’s lethal injection statute does not explicitly require physician involvement, 
but provides that the execution team shall include, among others, “those persons, such as 
medical personnel, who provide direct support for the administration of … lethal 
chemicals.”  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 546.720 (2007). 
227 See generally, supra notes 99 and 102. 
228 At the time that the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Baze v. Rees imposed a 
de facto moratorium on executions throughout the country, California’s stay was being 
reevaluated in light of changes to the state’s lethal injection procedures.  See Bob Egelko, 
Execution Moratorium Extended Until Fall at Least, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 2, 
2007, at B2.  In Missouri, however, the Eighth Circuit soon reversed the district court’s 
judgment and lifted the stay. Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007). 
229 See Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 29, 2007, at B6 (opining of the 
Missouri physicians, “Perhaps it’s not retribution that doctors fear, but the concept of 
violating the first tenet of the Hippocratic Oath.”). 
230 Monica Davey, Missouri Says It Can’t Hire Doctor for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2006 (reporting that Missouri state officials sent letters to 298 anesthesiologists 
residing near the state prison, and were turned down by all). 
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formal board discipline.  Consider, for example, the Missouri Governor’s 
public message regarding House Bill 820, which he succinctly described as 
a bill that “keeps the identities of members of the execution team 
confidential.”231  Only after a thorough description of the confidentiality 
provisions does the governor’s statement note, “The law also protects 
execution team members who are licensed by a board or department from 
being censured, reprimanded or suspended.”232  Indeed, a representative of 
the Missouri State Medical Association stated that while the state medical 
association did not take a formal position on the bill, its “principal 
controversy involved the confidentiality of the execution team.”233 
 
2. Establishing Safeguards to Protect Medical Interests 
 
Even if safe harbors were justified on the grounds of necessity and 
efficacy, they cannot be defended without first analyzing their impact on the 
state’s interests in medical regulation generally.  When a state chooses to 
enact a medical regulation for purposes unrelated to traditional medical 
goals, care must be taken to ensure that the regulation is not ultimately 
harmful to those medical goals.  In the case of disciplinary safe harbor 
policies enacted to support the state’s interests in criminal justice, states 
must ensure that the policies do not run to the detriment of prisoner-patient 
welfare (or, if they do, states must ensure that alternative mechanisms are in 
place to protect patient interests).  If there are no safeguards in place to 
protect medical interests, then a medical regulation ought to be adopted 
only if the state can demonstrate that its chosen purpose is demonstrably 
more compelling than its interest in patient health and welfare. 
 
a. Adequate Safeguards  
 
Though enacted to facilitate the involvement of licensed medical 
providers in executions, existing safe harbor statutes fail to provide 
adequate safeguards for the protection of prisoner-patient welfare.  They do 
nothing to ensure that execution participants act in good faith and cannot 
protect condemned prisoners from negligence or malice on the part of 
execution personnel. 
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical.  Imagine that the 
                                                 
231  Missouri Governor Matt Blunt News Release, Blunt Signs Bill to Protect Safety of 
Missourians Who Carry Out Death Penalty Law (July 2, 2007) (available at 
http://governor.mo.gov/press/DeathPenalty070207.htm). 
232 Id. 
233 E-mail from Tom Holloway, Missouri State Medical Association, to Ronald E. 
Day, Head of Reference Services, Biddle Law Library (Jan. 29, 2008) (on file with author). 
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state of Georgia has selected, from a group of physician volunteers, Dr. 
Jones, a graduate of a top medical school with excellent credentials and no 
history of malpractice or misconduct.  During his first execution, however, 
Dr. Jones performs a venous cut-down with no anesthetic, modifies the 
amount of drugs in the lethal injection cocktail (specifically, he decreases 
the amount of sodium thiopental, decreases the amount of pancuronium 
bromide, and increases the amount of potassium chloride), and instructs the 
technicians administering the injections to proceed even though the prisoner 
has not been properly anesthetized.234  The prisoner experiences pain during 
the venous cut-down and suffers unbearably during the lethal injection 
process because the sodium thiopental is insufficient to fully anesthetize 
him.235  Because the amount of pancuronium bromide is inadequate, the 
prisoner is not fully paralyzed and witnesses observe him straining against 
his restraints, grimacing, and crying out in pain before his death.236  After 
the procedure, Dr. Jones is asked why he deviated from standard medical 
procedures in a way that apparently resulted in a more painful death for the 
prisoner.  He explains that he believes the death penalty’s deterrent effects 
can only be realized if prisoners visibly suffer during the procedure.  
Moreover, Dr. Jones thinks that the prisoner, who was sentenced to death 
for torturing and murdering a child, “deserves to suffer.”237   
                                                 
234 Such last-minute procedural changes are by no means uncommon.  Correctional 
procedures rarely specify the amounts of drugs to be used, and the attending physician and 
warden generally have great latitude in modifying procedures during the execution.  In 
Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007), for example, the physician who was in 
charge of mixing chemicals and inserting IVs for six executions (later identified as Dr. 
Alan Doerhoff) admitted that he had “independent authority to alter the chemical doses at 
will based on his medical judgment, and that in fact, there were occasions when he chose to 
give a dose of only 2.5 grams of thiopental without notifying the director” of the 
Department of Corrections, despite the fact that Missouri’s unwritten execution protocol 
called for the administration of a 5-gram dose.  Id. at 1075.  Dr. Doerhoff, who is dyslexic 
and often transposes letters and numbers, also testified that he does not record the amount 
of the dose actually administered to inmates, and that “the chemical amounts listed in the 
execution logs are not always accurate as they represent only ‘an approximation’ of the 
chemicals used.”  Id.; Weil, supra note 47 (quoting Dr. Doerhoff as saying, “[I]t’s not 
unusual for me to make mistakes [as a result of my dyslexia]”).  The Eighth Circuit in 
Taylor was careful to note, however, that there was no evidence to indicate that the 
prisoners executed under Dr. Doerhoff’s watch experienced any significant pain.  Taylor, 
487 F.3d at 1075.  While there have been no reported cases of malicious behavior as 
egregious as in the above hypothetical, examples of lethal injections that have been 
“botched” due to negligence or professional incompetence abound.  See infra note 243. 
235 See Heath, supra note 39, at 93; Koniaris, supra note 39, at 1412. 
236 Id. 
237 For a real-life parallel to this perspective, see the interview in Gawande, supra note 
71, at 1224, with “Dr. A,” a physician who has participated in a number of executions.  
While admitting that he does not have a strong opinion about the death penalty, Dr. A. 
responded to inquiries about his motivations by stating, “I knew something about the past 
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In this hypothetical, Georgia’s medical board would have no 
authority to discipline Dr. Jones for his unprofessional behavior.  Georgia’s 
safe harbor statute provides that “[p]articipation in any execution” pursuant 
to the lethal injection procedures “shall not be the subject of any licensure 
challenge, suspension, or revocation” for any licensed Georgia medical 
professional.238  Indeed, the safe harbor provisions in other states are just as 
broadly drafted, generally providing that any assistance or participation in 
an execution may not be “the cause of” or “the subject of” any disciplinary 
challenge and that boards may not take action “because of” or “as a result 
of” a person’s participation in an execution.239  Effectively, such overbroad 
language prohibits boards from disciplining physicians even for gross 
malpractice that takes place during the course of an execution. 
Because Georgia’s exclusionary statute prohibits a civil action for 
medical malpractice,240 the only apparent remedy for the scenario described 
above would be a civil action by the family of the deceased prisoner for 
deliberate indifference by prison personnel during the course of an 
execution.  Given the procedural limitations on such an action, the 
narrowness of the deliberate indifference doctrine, and the difficulties 
families would face in obtaining evidence to support such a claim, it is 
extremely unlikely that a Section 1983 action could be used successfully as 
a post facto evaluation of execution personnel.241   
Ultimately, both safe harbor statutes, which prohibit medical boards 
from disciplining licensed personnel who act unprofessionally while 
participating in executions, and exclusionary statutes, which immunize 
                                                                                                                            
of these killers … [M]orally, if you think about the animal behavior of some of these 
people…”  There is no evidence, however, that Dr. A’s conduct during executions reflected 
his motivations in any way.  
238 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-42.1 (2007). 
239 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-80-108 (2007) (“any assistance” shall not be cause for 
discipline); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-704 (2007) (the board shall not discipline “as a 
result of” participation); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-42.1 (2007) (participation “shall not be the 
subject of any” disciplinary challenge); MISSOURI STAT. § 546.720 (2007) (the board shall 
not discipline a person “because of his … participation”); 59 Okl. Stat. Ann. § 4001 (2007) 
(no board shall take action “for the reason that the person participated in any manner”); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 137.476 (2007) (“any assistance” is not cause for discipline).  
240 GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-38(c) (2007). 
241 See generally, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988(a); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 
588-90 (1978) (holding that survival of a Section 1983 action is governed by state law); 
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989) (holding that state law statutes of limitations for 
personal injury actions govern Section 1983 claims); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976) (holding that, in order to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim in the context of 
medical care, a prisoner must demonstrate prison authorities’ deliberate indifference to his 
serious medical needs); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994) (holding that 
claims for deliberate indifference require a showing that prison officials were subjectively 
aware of the risk to a prisoner and nevertheless failed to act). 
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physicians from malpractice liability and prohibit medical boards from 
charging laypersons with the unlicensed practice of medicine, make it 
impossible or impractical for prisoners, their families, correctional officers, 
and the public to challenge the qualifications of execution participants.  
While a state may rightly conclude that, as a general matter, executions 
overseen by physicians are likely to be more humane than those conducted 
by unlicensed personnel, an absolute bar on board discipline assumes that 
physician involvement will, without exception, result in a more humane 
execution, and that board oversight will never be necessary – assumptions 
that, as shown herein, are untenable.  Given that there is already a serious 
lack of oversight in a national prison medical system that has been 
described as “inadequate ... and sometimes shockingly poor,”242 that our 
society has already been witness to a number of “botched” lethal 
injections,243 and that state and federal prisons continue to employ 
execution personnel whose professional competence is dubious,244 it is 
disconcerting that legislatures throughout the country are attempting to 
eliminate even the most unlikely mechanisms for post facto evaluation of 
execution personnel.245 
                                                 
242 John V. Jacobi, Prison Health Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 
AM. J. L. AND MED. 447 (2005).  
243 Even the first execution by lethal injection, in 1982, was plagued with errors.  Due 
to the prisoner’s history of intravenous drug use, execution technicians had difficulty 
finding a usable vein, and their repeated attempts left the prisoner bleeding.  Reinhold, 
supra note 47; Denno 2007, supra note 1, at 84.  The prison warden incorrectly mixed the 
thiopental and pancuronium bromide, obstructing the catheter used for injection.  See supra 
note 53.  Finally, when called to pronounce death, the prison physician found that the 
prisoner was still alive. See supra note 53.  Commenting in 2007 on how the first lethal 
injection actually played out, Dr. Chapman, the architect of the procedure, said, “It never 
occurred to me when we set this up that we'd have complete idiots administering the 
drugs.”  Weil, supra note 47.  See also Denno 2002, supra note 44, at 139-41 (describing 
lethal injection errors between 1983 and 2001); Weil, supra note 47 (reporting on errors 
during executions resulting from incompetence and negligence); Heath, supra note 39 
(describing recent botched executions in Ohio, Florida, and Oklahoma). 
244 Dr. Alan Doerhoff, the Missouri doctor whose qualifications and competence were 
challenged in Taylor, had been sued for malpractice more than twenty times, had his 
privileges revoked at two hospitals, and was ultimately barred by the District Court from 
“participating in any manner, at any level, in the State of Missouri’s lethal injection 
process.”  Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006). See 
also For Hire: Executioner, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MO.), B2 (January 20, 2008) 
[hereinafter, For Hire]; Weil, supra note 47 (citing testimony of an expert witness in Taylor 
who opined that a medical resident who practiced as Dr. Doerhoff admitted to practicing 
“wouldn’t be allowed to continue through a residency.”).  Nevertheless, Dr. Doerhoff was 
later hired to assist with federal executions.  For Hire, at B2. 
245 Admittedly, post-facto discipline by professional boards is an imperfect and 
unlikely means of ensuring the constitutionality of lethal injections.  This is in part because 
of boards’ traditionally cautious approach towards discipline, but also because of the 
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There are ways in which states could address some of these concerns 
about prisoner-patient welfare.  The simplest would be to craft a narrower 
safe harbor that protects only those execution participants who act in good 
faith and in compliance with procedural requirements.246  While such 
policies would likely be sufficient to protect against malicious actions, they 
would not address cases of negligence or incompetence.  Moreover, even 
these narrowly tailored safe harbors would be subject to the concerns set 
forth in Sections IV-B and IV-C-1.  Another method might be to 
incorporate additional procedural protections for prisoner-patients within 
the lethal injection protocols.247 However, no state department of 
corrections has publicly indicated that it has done so; moreover, because 
lethal injection procedures are generally adopted outside the normal 
administrative rulemaking process and kept confidential, it would be 
extremely difficult to determine whether they provide adequate safeguards. 
 
b. Compelling State Interests and Patient Protection 
 
Some state interests may be so compelling that they demand 
intervention in the medical sphere even if safeguards for individual patients 
are impossible or impractical.  In other words, a state may be justified in 
imposing a medical regulation that limits the autonomy of medical boards if 
its interests in enacting such a policy are so compelling that they outweigh 
                                                                                                                            
profession’s repeated assertions that physician participation in capital punishment is not the 
practice of medicine and thus presumably not subject to review on the basis of poor 
performance.  See, e.g., ASA Policy, supra note 61; Curran & Casscells, supra note 63, 
228-29.  That said, if boards were able to discipline only for poor performance (rather than 
participation), it is possible that some might use the means available to them.  
246 Disciplinary safe harbors that have been established in other medical contexts 
(including withdrawal of futile care, withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment pursuant to a 
DNR order, harvesting of organs in accordance with a patient’s wishes, and prescription of 
opiates for pain management) generally offer immunity only to those physicians who act in 
good faith or otherwise comply with procedural and substantive requirements.  See, e.g., 
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, at 54, 58 (2007) (describing the “good 
faith” requirement for withdrawal of futile care).  
247 Traditional safe harbors, such as the ones described in note 246, supra, immunize 
physicians from discipline for certain unilateral actions but impose clear statutory 
requirements as to when and how physicians can take those actions. In the end-of-life 
context, for example, statutory requirements for valid DNR orders and organ donation 
requests help to assure that patient wishes will be followed.  See, e.g., Charles P. Sabatino, 
Survey of State EMS-DNR Laws and Protocols, 27 J.L. Med. & Ethics 297, 302-04 (Winter 
1999) (discussing statutory safe harbors for emergency medical providers complying with 
do not resuscitate orders); Uniform Anatomical Gift Act §18(a) (providing that a person 
who attempts in good faith to comply with the Act shall be immune from liability in civil, 
criminal, and administrative proceedings).   
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its traditional interests in protecting patient welfare.   
Consider, for example, a massive public health emergency during 
which a state suspends its medical licensing statutes.248  Such intervention 
might be necessary if there were a shortage of in-state medical providers 
and the only way to secure medical treatment for the state’s population were 
to use the services of out-of-state providers and unlicensed individuals with 
medical training (such as medical students and volunteers with CPR 
certification).  While state medical licensing statutes are clearly aimed at 
protecting patient welfare and there is a risk that patients treated by 
unlicensed and potentially negligent providers will suffer harm, the state’s 
interest in minimizing a statewide catastrophe outweighs these concerns.  
By contrast, it is by no means clear that states with disciplinary safe harbors 
for execution participants would be able to demonstrate that their interests 
in executing condemned criminals by way of lethal injection are so strong 
that they outweigh the state’s traditional medical interests in prisoner-
patient welfare.  It is important to note that this requirement does not 
demand a comprehensive defense of capital punishment generally; those 
states that allow capital punishment do so because their citizens have 
already determined that it is an essential mechanism of the criminal justice 
system.  Rather, states need only show that their interests in administering 
capital punishment – at this time and in this particular manner – are so 
strong as to outweigh their interests in traditional medical regulation. 
Even this model, however, may be problematic in extreme cases. 
Consider, for example, a disciplinary safe harbor that protects physicians 
who facilitate the interrogation, abuse, or torture of alleged terrorists in 
criminal or military contexts.249  If a terroristic threat were real and 
imminent enough that the state could reasonably declare an interest in 
protecting the public from immediate catastrophic harm, this interest might 
outweigh the state’s interests in protecting medical professionalism and the 
welfare of patients in its custody.  There may be no easy solution to this 
problem, except to call on the distinction between cases such as these (and 
the public health emergency described above), where imminent harm is 
likely to occur, and that of capital punishment, where the public threat 
posed by an unexecuted criminal is far less severe. 
 
                                                 
248 See supra note 131. 
249 For articles citing evidence of medical participation in interrogations at 
Guantanamo Bay, see, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to 
War, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3 (Jan. 6, 2005); Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, 
60-71 (July 11, 2005). 
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V. PROFESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE HARBOR POLICIES 
 
As important as it is to recognize that most safe harbor policies 
cannot be supported by reference to the three justifications described above, 
this conclusion, on its own, is not likely to significantly further the 
academic discourse.  While courts are generally considered immune from 
the vagaries of inconsistent jurisprudence, state legislatures regularly adopt 
statutes that are poorly tailored, targeted at uncertain goals, or lacking in 
theoretical support.  Often, such statutes exist to satisfy the expressive 
function of law -- that is, to make a political or social statement, even if that 
statement is unlikely to have any immediate practical effect.250  However, 
even primarily expressive laws must be evaluated in light of their potential 
(even unintended) consequences. 251 
Judging by the history in Section II and the analysis in Section IV, 
disciplinary safe harbors and similar policies for facilitating medical 
involvement in executions are more likely to serve expressive functions 
than to have significant practical effects on the implementation of capital 
punishment.  This Section considers whether safe harbors may instead have 
unintended consequences outside the realm of capital punishment – in the 
realm of medical practice.  A preliminary analysis suggests that disciplinary 
safe harbors and other unjustified limitations on medical board autonomy 
may negatively affect public trust in the medical profession.  Because 
public trust is a key determinant of medicine’s ability to achieve the public 
interests it has been charged with protecting – namely, patient welfare and 
public health – policymakers would be remiss in adopting safe harbors 
without first considering these potential consequences.  Though further 
empirical inquiries into the likelihood of such effects should be pursued, 
simply introducing theories of medical trust into the public discourse about 
medical involvement in lethal injections will surely help elevate the quality 
of debate. 
 
A.  Trust, Medicine, and the Pursuit of Public Interests 
 
Although much has been written about the importance of trust in 
medical practice, Mark Hall’s comprehensive work on law and medical 
trust is most instructive in this regard.252  Hall asserts that trust has both 
                                                 
250 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2031-33 (1995). 
251 Id. at 2044-2048. 
252 See generally, Hall, supra note 120; Hall, supra note 125; Mark A. Hall et al., Trust 
in the Medical Profession: Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 37 HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 1419 (2002).  
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intrinsic and instrumental value in the physician-patient relationship253 and 
posits that the conditions of intense vulnerability inherent in serious illness 
and even routine medical care “magnify the role that trust plays in medical 
relationships.254  Without some minimal level of trust in medical 
professionals and institutions, patients would not be willing to “seek care, 
submit to treatment, disclose necessary information, or follow treatment 
recommendations.”255  Moreover, nonspecific healing effects, such as the 
placebo effect, are dependent on the intervention of a trusted healer, rather 
than any particular therapeutic agent.256  Ultimately, Hall concludes, trust is 
“essential for activating the charismatic or emotive dimension of healing 
that is fundamental to effective treatment relationships.”257  Perhaps more 
importantly, once lost, this trust (whether systemic or individual) is 
extremely difficult to regain.258   
Though Hall’s work focuses on the connection between trust and 
effective clinical practice, it is also important to recognize that the medical 
profession is often called upon to serve public goals beyond the realm of 
patient care.  Because a variety of social institutions rely on the authority 
and credibility of the medical profession,259 promotion of medical trust is 
likely to further not only the state’s interests in patient welfare and public 
health, but also its interests in other non-medical goals.  Consider, for 
example, judicial and legislative reliance on the testimony of medical 
experts; the cooperation between public health authorities and medical 
providers that is necessary to identify, contain, and treat public health 
threats; or, most relevant to this discussion, the state’s dependence on 
medical technology and professionals to implement the process of capital 
punishment.  In each of these contexts, society has sought guidance from 
the medical profession not merely because of its technical expertise but also 
because of the legitimacy that medical involvement brings.260  If this sense 
                                                 
253 Hall, supra note 120, at 477-482; Hall, supra note 125, at 614.  
254 Hall, supra note 120, at 471. 
255 Id. at 478. See also Hall, supra note 125, at 614; Starr, supra note 212, at 5 
(addressing the importance of clinical authority to the therapeutic process); David 
Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661 (1998) (describing the effects of erosion of trust on the 
effectiveness of medical interventions). 
256 Hall, supra note 120, at 479-80. 
257 Id. at 480. 
258 Id. at 508-09. 
259 See generally, Starr, supra note 212, at 14-15 (addressing medical authority as a 
“resource for social order”). 
260 As noted in Section II, supra, lethal injection technology was so quickly and widely 
accepted after its 1977 adoption in Oklahoma not because of its demonstrated effectiveness 
(after all, the first execution by lethal injection did not take place until 1982) but because 
there was something intrinsically reassuring about the introduction of medicine into the 
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of legitimacy and respectability is lost, many of the perceived benefits of 
reliance on medicine in these various realms would likewise be lost.261 
Given these “psychological realities of trust,”262 Hall hypothesizes 
three different stances that the law could take with respect to trust in 
medicine: a predicated stance, which “takes the existence of trust as a 
factual premise” for the imposition of legal rules; a supportive stance, 
which uses the law as a mechanism for sustaining or promoting trust; and a 
skeptical stance, which crafts legal alternatives to trust where trust is 
nonexistent or undeserved.263  While Hall makes no normative conclusions 
about the comparative validity of these approaches, he notes that the 
supportive approach has found purchase among scholars in the field.  Hall 
recognizes a “widespread agreement” that trust in the medical profession is 
desirable and should be promoted,264 and describes the preservation and 
enhancement of trust as prominent objectives of health care law.265  
There is indeed strong support among scholars for some iteration of 
a supportive stance towards trust broadly defined.266  One of the 
                                                                                                                            
execution chamber.  Who better to push the plunger than Marcus Welby, M.D.?  See 
Federman and Holmes, supra note 7, at 446 (noting that the use of a "therapeutic 
discourse" regarding the death penalty evidences a “sanitization of the capital punishment 
process”); Johnson, supra note 12, at 46 (describing society’s attempts to develop a method 
of execution that is "the most tame and reliable method of killing made possible by existing 
technology”). 
261 Consider, for example, a member of Missouri’s lethal injection team whose name 
was disclosed on the front page of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch despite a recently enacted 
state law prohibiting the public identification of execution team members.  Jeremy Kohler, 
Execution Nurse had Criminal Past, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MO.), A1, Jan. 13, 2008.  
Although his nursing license was “unblemished,” his “special knowledge, skills, and 
abilities” were described as “one of a kind,” and there was no evidence that he had 
committed any negligence or misconduct during an execution, Id., the editors deemed it 
“crucial” to disclose his identity because, at the time he was performing executions in 
Missouri, he was on probation after pleading no contest to two misdemeanors. For Hire, 
supra note 244.  While not condoning the newspaper’s disclosure, I use this case as an 
example of how a medical provider’s lapse of moral judgment may be judged just as 
harshly, if not more, than a lapse of clinical competence. 
262 Hall, supra note 120, at 472. 
263 Id. at 486. 
264 Id. at 504-05.  Hall notes that this “widespread agreement” exists despite a lack of 
empirical support for the assumption that trust needs support and that legal mechanisms are 
effective in providing such support.  Id.  See generally, infra note 270. 
265 Id. at 470-71.  This is consistent with Friedson’s sociological view, which posits 
that the medical profession sustains and maintains its special status in society “by its 
persuasive profession of the extraordinary trustworthiness of its members.”  Eliot Freidson, 
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE, xv 
(1988). 
266 See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence and Health Care: Fostering Trust in 
Medicine Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 402-403, n. 36 (2004) (identifying 
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foundational principles of modern health law scholarship is the recognition 
that something unique about illness and the doctor-patient relationship – 
alternatively called vulnerability, trust, or fiduciary duty – warrants 
differential and protective treatment under the law.267  Skeptical attitudes 
towards medical trust, which hold that patients are merely medical 
consumers and that the law should not encourage irrational trust founded on 
overly optimistic archetypes, go directly against this founding principle of 
health law scholarship.  While not everyone may be willing to defend a 
strong supportive stance, those who acknowledge the existence of medical 
trust and recognize its importance to the achievement of state goals ought to 
agree that the trust implications of medical regulations warrant 
consideration by policymakers.268 
 
B.  Law as a Mechanism for Supporting Systemic Trust 
 
Any view of the law as a mechanism for producing, maintaining, or 
increasing medical trust is based on the presumption that trust in the 
professions is contingent on and can be affected by legal rules and 
attitudes.269  Though there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
changes in health care law affect trust in individual physicians,270 Hall 
suggests that the apparent robustness of trust in physicians is tied to 
“diffuse” or “systemic” medical trust, which in turn is “fostered by 
                                                                                                                            
the author as a proponent of the position that medical trust or confidence “should be 
preserved, if not promoted, as a matter of policy”); Mechanic, supra note 255, at 683 
(“Regulation provides a counterpoint to distrust by controlling its most apparent causes.  If 
such regulation can be appropriately targeted, it will provide a stronger basis for trust.”). 
267 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as 
Medical Consumers, 96 GEO. L. J. 583, 594-96 (2008) (exploring the special features of 
medical relationships by reference to the law’s approach to imposing payment obligations 
on patients who have received medical care); Ruger, supra note 117, at 645 (describing 
how health law coalesced around the conception of patient rights to impose an obligation to 
care for patients in emergencies even absent any preexisting treatment relationship).  See 
also Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10:2 PHIL AND PUB. 
AFFAIRS 146 (Spring 1981) (arguing that health care needs are special and distinctive 
because of their impact on equality of human opportunity). 
268 While promotion of medical trust alone may not be an adequate justification for the 
adoption of medical regulations, a regulation that is justified on police power grounds and 
otherwise satisfies constitutional scrutiny ought to be evaluated by policymakers with 
respect to its likely impact on medical trust. 
269 Hall, supra note 120, at 496-98. 
270 Id. at 505-507 (surveying the limited scholarship in this area and concluding that 
trust in physicians “may be more resilient than we often suppose”).  However, Hall warns 
against relying too much on this apparent resilience, emphasizing that “threats to trust are 
real and should be taken seriously.” Id. at 508. 
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institutional and social mechanisms such as licensure or peer review.”271  
Indeed, studies have shown that patient trust in individual medical providers 
is distinct from trust in medical organizations and the profession as a 
whole,272 and that systemic trust has a strong influence on interpersonal 
trust.273  Hall describes licensure and certification laws as among the most 
obvious examples of laws crafted to bolster public trust,274 and notes that 
the stability of such standard-setting laws may serve to protect systemic 
trust even in the face of misconduct by individual physicians.275 
Though further empirical work certainly needs to be done in this 
area, Hall’s suggestion that licensure and other standard-setting laws play a 
role in establishing systemic medical trust is consistent with the system of 
professionalism described in Section III.  Medical board licensure, peer 
review, and other self-regulatory mechanisms are embodiments of 
professional autonomy, one of the key elements of modern theories of 
professionalism.  Thus, it is only a short step from Hall’s argument that 
licensure and peer review are key to maintaining systemic medical trust to 
the broader argument that medical trust is driven in large part by the special 
self-regulatory authority granted to the professions under American law, 
including the authority to discipline providers who fall short of professional 
standards.276  In other words, the trust that is required for the medical 
profession to effectively achieve social goals does not arise exclusively 
from public perceptions of individual physicians. Rather, the legal 
delegation of regulatory power to the medical profession itself engenders 
trust in the profession.277   
Indeed, evidence suggests that public perceptions of medicine’s 
                                                 
271 Id. at 508. 
272 Hall, supra note 125, at 619-20; see also David Mechanic, Changing Medical 
Organization and the Erosion of Trust, 74 Milbank Q. 171, 173-74 (1996) (describing the 
distinctions and correlations between interpersonal and systemic trust). 
273 Hall, supra note 125, at 620; Mechanic, supra note 272, at 173-74. 
274 Hall, supra note 120, at 501. 
275 Id. at 508.  
276 See also, Starr, supra note 212, at 19-20 (identifying professional authority as “built 
into the structure of institutions” such as the law; noting that the “authority that inheres in 
the status of physician” does so “because it has been institutionalized in a system of 
standardized education and licensing”).   
277 Beyond its effect on systemic medical trust, professional autonomy in matters of 
self-regulation may also impact the profession’s effectiveness by affecting physicians’ own 
perceptions of their role.  See, e.g., David Orentlicher, The Role of Professional Self-
Regulation, in REG. OF HEALTHCARE PROFS., supra note 120, at 130-32 (noting that the 
internal development of guidelines leads to greater physician satisfaction); Robert D. Troug 
and Troyen A. Brennan, Participation of Physicians in Capital Punishment, 329 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 1346 (Oct. 28, 1993) (describing “[e]fforts to ensure ethical behavior from 
within the profession” as preferable to legislation attempting to “enforce such behavior 
from without.”). 
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accountability and respectability are, now more than ever, tied to the 
profession’s ability to independently and effectively police its members.  A 
recent Gallup poll concluded that a majority of consumers of medical care 
believe that the oversight authority granted to independent medical boards 
is “very important” as a formal check on physician behavior.278  Moreover, 
recent public criticism of medical boards’ alleged impotence suggests that 
the public favors an even greater disciplinary role for boards and will voice 
its concern if it appears that the medical profession cannot or will not act in 
the interests of patients, whether as a result of professional 
self-protection,279 state intervention,280 or other reasons.281  Most recently, 
some state legislatures are responding to these concerns by enacting 
                                                 
278 The Gallup Organization (for The American Board of Internal Medicine), 
Awareness of and Attitudes Toward Board-Certification of Physicians (Aug. 2003) (64% 
feel that it is “very important” for physicians to be evaluated on an ongoing basis by an 
independent board; 81% know what state licensing is and report that their personal 
physicians are licensed). 
279 Much criticism directed towards the medical profession in recent years has arisen in 
connection with allegations that the medical profession is more sensitive to its own 
economic interests than to the health interests of patients. Consider, for example, the 
AMA’s 1997 agreement to endorse a line of health-related products made by Sunbeam, 
which was widely criticized once it became clear that the AMA would not be testing the 
quality of the endorsed products. Glenn Collins, Look Who’s Doing Endorsements, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997. Within a week of its announcement, the AMA abandoned the 
Sunbeam deal, citing widespread “public doubt” about its “motives” and “credibility.” 
Glenn Collins, AMA Seeks to Dismantle Sunbeam Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997.   
280 Independence from political influences has long been recognized as a key factor in 
facilitating effective medical board function.  State Discipline of Physicians, supra note 
148, at 9.  Historically, policies that have modified the scope of medical authority for 
political reasons unrelated to patient welfare – for example, to facilitate criminal 
prosecution or to protect prevailing moral norms – have been criticized as inappropriate 
political intrusions upon professional practice.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 84-86 (U.S. 2001) (holding that a hospital policy of using diagnostic tests to 
incriminate drug-abusing patients was unconstitutional because its immediate objective 
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes, rather than treatment); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (U.S. 1965) (Goldburg, Harlan, White concurrence) 
(noting that the legitimate government interest of discouraging extra-marital relations can 
be served by a statute more tailored than one criminalizing medical assistance in procuring 
birth control).  See generally, Richard H. Shryock, Freedom and Interference in Medicine, 
200 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 32, 39-41 (November 1938) (describing public 
criticism of state laws grounded in religious and moral concerns). 
281 See, e.g., David Mechanic, Changing Medical Organization and the Erosion of 
Trust, 74 MILBANK Q. 171, 172-73, 178 (1996) (discussing the effects of managed care 
organization gag rules that prohibit physicians from discussing incentives for withholding 
care); Stephen M. Shortell et al., Physicians as Double Agents: Maintaining Trust in an 
Era of Multiple Accountabilities, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1102, 1102-04 (Sept. 23, 1998) 
(addressing the potential for managed care arrangements to undermine public confidence in 
physicians’ willingness to act in patients’ interests). 
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legislation to strengthen their medical boards’ oversight authority.282  In 
other words, Americans believe that medical boards have an important role 
to play in discipline and professional self-regulation, even if the boards may 
not currently be living up to public expectations in this regard.283   
The theory that public trust in the medical profession is linked to the 
legal mandate for professional self-regulation is consistent with Hall’s 
conclusions regarding the possible effects of state regulation.  Under the 
supportive approach to health care law described by Hall, excessive or 
unjustified state regulation of the medical profession ought to be avoided on 
the grounds that it is likely to diminish trust in the profession and, 
consequently, diminish the profession’s effectiveness in achieving public 
goals.284  For example, Hall writes, legal mandates to improve physician 
performance can, in some cases, “backfire by conveying to the public an 
attitude of distrust and by reducing medical actors’ motivations to behave in 
a trustworthy fashion.”285  While this risk is hardly a per se argument 
against state regulation, it does give us reason to seek out strong 
justifications for laws regulating the medical profession.   
 
C.  Safe Harbors and their Implications for Medical Trust  
 
If the current system of licensure, discipline, and self-regulation is 
indeed supportive of systemic medical trust, then policymakers considering 
changes to this system ought to first evaluate their potential trust 
implications.  In the case of disciplinary safe harbor policies, which limit 
medical boards’ disciplinary discretion without adequate justification, the 
potential consequences for systemic medical trust are significant. 
As recounted in Section III, the professions enjoy a privileged status 
under American law.  Laws regulating professional practice must be 
                                                 
282 Kevin B. O’Reilly, Doctor Disciplinary Actions Down for Third Year, AM. MED. 
NEWS (May 12, 2008) (reporting that Indiana, New Mexico, and Washington enacted 
legislation in 2008 to “beef[] up board authority,” and that nine other states are considering 
similar changes).  See, for example, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-6-15.1 (2008), a New Mexico 
law enacted in 2008 that grants the state medical board authority to summarily suspend a 
physician’s license without a hearing upon commission of certain crimes. 
283 See generally, Stephen R. Latham, Medical Professionalism: A Parsonian View, 69 
MT. SINAI J. MED. 363, 365 (Nov. 2002) (noting that although the Parsonian model of 
professional motivations may fail as a factual description, it should be viewed as a 
normative description of what professionalism ought to be); Eliot Freidson, 
"Professionalism and Institutional Ethics,” in Baker, supra note 121, at 139 (arguing that if 
medical ethics are to be more than “mere window dressing,” the medical profession must 
undertake vigorous legal enforcement and “defend … the institutional circumstances which 
encourage ethical practice.”). 
284 Hall, supra note 120, at 486.   
285 Id. at 509-11.  
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justified under the state’s police powers, and restrictions on medical 
licensure must comply with substantive and procedural due process 
requirements.286  Moreover, state medical board decisions are reviewed 
under a deferential standard; they are overturned only if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence.287  Accordingly, as a matter of both law 
and public policy, a state that abandons its deferential stance towards 
medical boards in matters of professional licensing and discipline must 
offer compelling reasons for doing so.   
When a state limits the powers previously delegated to a 
professional board without adequate justification, its actions suggest to the 
public that traditional understandings of professionalism offer no more than 
an illusory protection of professional autonomy, and that the profession is 
no more able to withstand state intrusion than any skilled or unskilled trade.    
If the state demonstrates a dismissive attitude towards medical self-
regulation, the public may well follow suit, becoming less willing to 
recognize professional authority and more likely to adopt the role of 
skeptical consumer.  This public skepticism, in turn, threatens the 
effectiveness of the American medical system, which, according to Hall and 
others, operates on a foundation of systematic and interpersonal medical 
trust.  Moreover, if, as scholars have noted, professionalism in 
self-regulation is the basis of every profession’s contract with society, then 
medicine’s inability to enforce its collective standards, even in a limited 
context, may lead to a weakening of this social contract.  Trust in individual 
physicians is grounded in their membership in “a community that has 
objectively validated their competence” and monitors them on an ongoing 
basis by sanctioning those whose professional or technical qualifications are 
inadequate.288  Absent some assurance that practicing physicians satisfy the 
standards set by the profession, patients will have little reason to ascribe 
value to their independent exercise of medical judgment.289 
                                                 
286 Dent v. State of W.Va., 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889). 
287 Furrow, supra note 55, at 79-80. 
288 Starr, supra note 212, at 12-13 (noting that the medical professional “offers 
judgments and advice, not as a personal act based on  . . . idiosyncratic criteria, but as a 
representative of a community” of shared standards and values). 
289 It is important to distinguish the traditional argument from interpersonal trust that 
has been made by many critics of physician participation in capital punishment from the 
argument from systemic trust emphasized in this Article.  I posit the threat posed by state 
interference in medicine’s ability to discipline physicians who deviate from professional 
norms is entirely distinct from, and much more problematic than, the threat posed by the 
individual physicians themselves.  Consider the distinction between statutes requiring 
physician participation in lethal injection and statutes establishing disciplinary safe harbors 
for participants.  Physician participation statutes do not impose an affirmative obligation on 
any particular provider; rather, they allow each physician to choose for himself whether 
assisting in an execution is consistent with his personal norms.  In contrast, disciplinary 
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Two challenges are likely to be raised against the argument that 
unjustified limitations on medical board disciplinary authority may 
negatively impact trust in the profession.  First, for any policy to have an 
impact on public trust, the public must be aware of the policy and possibly 
the circumstances surrounding its adoption.  While there was little public 
discussion of existing safe harbor policies at the time of their passage,290 a 
number of factors suggest that proposals to adopt new safe harbors will 
garner greater public attention in the future.  Capital punishment has always 
been a highly visible issue, provoking strong emotional and political 
opinions, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baze has once again 
brought it to the forefront.  Press coverage of “botched” lethal injections 
and scandals surrounding execution personnel abounds.291  Medical and law 
journals are flooded with academic research about medical involvement in 
lethal injections.292  At least one state’s medical board and department of 
corrections are engaged in a well-publicized legal dispute over the 
discipline of execution personnel.293  In this environment, and particularly 
given the modern trend toward increasing the powers of medical boards,294 
any state that suddenly chooses to limit board authority by adopting a safe 
harbor is likely to draw the notice of its citizens. 
Second, some may argue that unjustified legislative interventions are 
likely to have a greater impact on public trust in the legislature than trust in 
the regulated profession, and therefore that concerns about safe harbors’ 
effects on medical trust are overblown.  While there is no question that 
regulations adopted without compelling justifications cast doubt on the 
legislature’s ability to adopt sound and well-reasoned laws, these 
                                                                                                                            
safe harbors are likely to be far more pernicious, because they call into question not the 
moral agency of individual physicians, but the regulatory ability and authority of the 
profession as a whole.  For an analogous example, see Massachussetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007), in which petitioners opposed an argument by the EPA that it lacked statutory 
authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases because they did not fall within the 
definition of “air pollution” under the Act.  The contested issue was the EPA’s alleged 
inability to enforce its guidelines, not the fact that individual manufacturers were operating 
in a manner that violated emissions requirements.   
290 See Section II-C, supra. 
291 See, e.g., Weil, supra note 47; For Hire, supra note 244. 
292 See, e.g., Denno 2007, supra note 1; Waisel, supra note 154; Gawande, supra note 
71. 
293 N.C. Dep’t of Corrections et al v. N.C. Med. Board, Civ. No. 07- 003574 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2007), petition granted, 661 S.E. 2d 736 (N.C. 2008).  For press 
coverage of this dispute, see Sarah Avery, Executions Pose Dilemma for Doctors, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, July 31, 2008, at B4; Titan Barksdale, Board to Appeal Execution Ruling, 
NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 10, 2007, at B5; Editorial: Death Docs?, NEWS & OBSERVER, 
Sept. 25, 2007, at A8. 
294 See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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regulations, when they act to restrict board authority, undoubtedly cast 
similar doubt on the medical profession’s ability to act in the public interest.  
Perhaps the relevant distinction, then, is one of authority – a legislature that 
adopts a safe harbor statute has full authority to act but demonstrates a 
failure in reasoning, whereas a medical board that refrains from disciplining 
execution participants may have a well-reasoned theory of discipline but 
simply lacks the legal authority to implement it. 
Further empirical research is necessary to determine whether this 
hypothesis about the trust effects of unjustified limitations on medical board 
authority is valid.  However, though current evidence has not yet provided a 
definitive answer, policymakers considering the adoption of safe harbors 
would be remiss if they failed to consider their potential impact on medical 
practice and public trust in addition to their potential impact on the practice 
of lethal injection.  In bringing to light these considerations regarding 
systemic medical trust, this Article will help further public debate by 
ensuring that future policies designed to encourage medical participation in 
executions are evaluated no differently than traditional regulations on the 
practice of medicine – that is, by reference to their potential consequences 
in the professional sphere. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
The analysis set forth in this Article leads to two relevant 
conclusions for those policymakers considering the adoption of policies for 
facilitating medical involvement in executions.  The first has broad 
implications for health care law generally; the second, for theories of capital 
punishment. 
This Article’s primary contribution to the field of health law is the 
connection it draws between the adoption of regulations on the practice of 
medicine that lack adequate policy support and the medical profession’s 
ability to effectively serve public interests.  Because unjustified medical 
regulations may lead to a loss of confidence in the authority and 
independence of the medical profession – and because public confidence is 
essential for effective medical practice – it is particularly important that 
policymakers seek strong justifications before enacting laws that limit 
medical board discretion.  Even if disciplinary safe harbors serve important 
expressive functions, they should not be adopted if further empirical inquiry 
demonstrates that they are likely to erode systemic medical trust.295    
In the realm of capital punishment, this Article suggests that the 
                                                 
295 This conclusion, however, is based on the principle that medical boards have 
legitimate authority over matters relating to professional ethics, which, although widely 
accepted in the legal literature, still needs a more thorough defense.  See supra note 134. 
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constitutional justifications for disciplinary safe harbors are weak and have 
been weakened even further by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baze 
v. Rees.  As a result, it is important to understand why legislatures have 
sought and still seek to facilitate medical involvement in executions.  Recall 
that when Arkansas first learned that physicians might be unwilling to 
participate in lethal injections, the state initially considered a return to 
electrocution; however, this option was rejected as “taking a step backward” 
to a less humane era.296  This response was understandable, given that the 
historical development of capital punishment technologies demonstrates a 
societal preference for clinical detachment over prejudice, technology over 
brutality, and silence over clamor.  However, given the very real problems 
that have arisen in using the modern lethal injection protocol, one wonders 
whether this preference is founded more on cosmetic than constitutional 
concerns.297  Assuming that the practice of capital punishment is indeed 
valuable enough to preserve, perhaps, rather than asking the medical 
profession to abandon its ethical principles to facilitate a quasi-clinical 
execution protocol, we should instead ask society to come to terms with its 
own moral qualms about a process it has long sought to conceal. 
                                                 
296 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
297 As much was implied by Justice Stevens during the oral argument in Baze v. Rees. 
When the respondents’ attorney justified the use of pancuronium bromide, a paralytic, in 
Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol as a means to bringing about a “more dignified death.”  
Justice Stevens asked him whether the “dignity” of the current process outweighs the “risk 
of excruciating pain.” If a prisoner were offered a single-drug protocol that posed no risk of 
pain but involved the appearance of indignity, Justice Stevens asked, “Would he prefer to 
say, I want to die in a dignified way?”  Baze Transcript, at 33-34.  See also Leigh 
Buchanan Bienen, Anomalies: Ritual and Language in Lethal Injection Regulations, 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. __ (2008), available at SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116662 
(arguing that state lethal injection protocols are little more than public relations documents 
describing “hypothetical rituals meant to reassure [observers] that a controlled and orderly 
process, in accordance with the rule of law, will take place”). 
